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presidential administration that immigrants “never” appear in court drive central policy
decisions on immigration enforcement, including growing the immigration detention
system, limiting access to asylum, and building a border wall. By reviewing
immigration court data from 2008 to 2018 made publicly available by the Executive
Office of Immigration Review, this Article provides the first-ever independent analysis
of in absentia removal orders. Contrary to claims that all immigrants abscond, our
data-driven analysis reveals that 88% of all immigrants in immigration court with
completed or pending removal cases over the past eleven years attended all of their court
hearings. If we limit our analysis to only nondetained cases, we still find a high
compliance rate: 83% of all respondents in completed or pending removal cases attended
all of their hearings since 2008. Moreover, we reveal that 15% of those who were
ordered deported in absentia since 2008 successfully reopened their cases and had their
in absentia orders rescinded. Digging deeper, we identify three factors associated with
in absentia removal: having a lawyer, applying for relief from removal (such as
asylum), and court jurisdiction. These and other important findings have immediate
implications for key immigration policy questions.
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INTRODUCTION
Do immigrants come to their immigration court hearings? This question
is central to current debates about the immigration court system. President
Donald Trump and members of his Administration have made bold and
inconsistent claims about purportedly dismal court appearance rates. In 2018
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and 2019, government oﬃcials contended that noncitizens never appear in
court;1 that only 2% or 3% of immigrants appear in court;2 and that 20% appear
in court.3 Policymakers rely on these and other assertions about purported
failures to appear to drive key decisions, including to expand reliance on
immigration detention4 and to reduce access to asylum.5 Appearance rates are
also pivotal to the current debate about building a border wall, which the
Administration has sought to justify in part by claiming that those who cross
the southern border simply “vanish” into the country and never come to court.6

1
See, e.g., Remarks During a Roundtable Discussion on Tax Reform in Cleveland, Ohio,
2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (May 5, 2018) (“Our immigration laws are a disgrace . . . . We
give them, like, trials. That’s the good news. The bad news is, they never show up for the trial. . . .
Nobody ever shows up.”); Remarks Prior to a Working Lunch with President Kersti Kaljulaid of
Estonia, President Raimonds Vejonis of Latvia, and President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania and
an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3 (Apr. 3, 2018) (“We cannot have
people ﬂowing into our country illegally, disappearing, and, by the way, never showing up to court.”).
2
Remarks at the American Farm Bureau Federation’s 100th Annual Convention in New
Orleans, Louisiana, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6 (Jan. 14, 2019) (“Tell me, what percentage of
people come back [for their trial]? Would you say 100 percent? No, you’re a little oﬀ. Like, how about
2 percent? [Laughter] . . . Two percent come back. Those 2 percent are not going to make America
great again, that I can tell you. [Laughter]”); Remarks at the National Federation of Independent
Businesses 75th Anniversary Celebration, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 5 (June 19, 2018) (“Do
you know, if a person comes in and puts one foot on our ground . . . they let the person go; they say
show back up to court in 1 year from now. One year. . . . But here’s the thing: That in itself is
ridiculous. Like 3 percent come back.”).
3
White House Legislative Director Marc Short told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that “[e]ighty
percent of those that are coming here illegally never show up for court and are never deported.”
Kyle Feldscher & Marc Rod, White House Says Family Separations at the Border Are a ‘Binary Choice,’ but
Stats Say Otherwise, CNN (June 18, 2018, 9:54 PM EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/familyseparations-marc-short-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3QY-BLSW] (internal quotation marks
omitted). CNN reported that it was “unclear where Short got his statistic that 80% of the people
who come to the US illegally do not show up for court.” Id.
4
For example, amid claims that migrants will not come to court, President Trump has called
for $4.2 billion in additional funding to dramatically increase the federal government’s capacity to
detain immigrants. See President Donald J. Trump Calls on Congress to Secure Our Borders and Protect
the American People, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
president-donald-j-trump-calls-congress-secure-borders-protect-american-people [https://perma.cc/
2NJH-WW5V].
5
On November 9, 2018, President Trump issued a presidential proclamation drastically
reducing access to asylum, supported in part by a claim that under the present system, “many
released aliens fail to appear for hearings.” Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661, 57,661
(Nov. 9, 2018).
6
See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 2, 2019, 12:04
PM EST), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinetmeeting-12 [https://perma.cc/DGU8-VBE6] (arguing that “[t]he United States needs a physical
barrier, needs a wall, to stop illegal immigration” and claiming that without a wall asylum seekers will
enter the country and instead of coming to court will “vanish[] and escape[] the law”). For an excellent
review of the range of enforcement policies implemented by President Trump, see SHOBA SIVAPRASAD
WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF TRUMP (2019).
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Under the immigration law in eﬀect since 1990, an immigration judge
must order a noncitizen who misses even one court hearing deported.7 This
type of deportation without the individual being present in court is called in
absentia removal,8 based on the Latin phrase meaning “in the absence of.”9
Prior to 1990, immigration judges had discretion over how to handle missed
court appearances, including by holding an in absentia hearing, dismissing the
case, continuing the case, or administratively closing the case.10 The 1990
change in the law formally eliminated this judicial authority to make
independent determinations as to how to proceed when respondents fail to
appear in court.11 Instead, immigration judges must order removal in absentia
if the respondent is not in court at the scheduled hearing, provided the
government can ﬁrst establish by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence” that the noncitizen is subject to removal and that written notice of
the hearing was provided to the respondent.12 Those subject to in absentia
7
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5063 (codiﬁed
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(a) (2018)) (“Any alien who . . . does not attend a proceeding
under section 242, shall be ordered deported under section 242(b)(1) in absentia.”). As Eisha Jain has
shown, deportation is just the tip of a larger enforcement system that bears many similarities to the
criminal justice system. See generally Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1463 (2019).
8
The term removal has been used since 1997 to refer to the decision of the immigration
judge to order an individual removed from the United States. Prior to April 1997, removal
proceedings were separated into distinct procedures for exclusion and deportation. See, e.g., Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(d)(4)(B),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (amending a section of the immigration law by “striking ‘exclusion or
deportation’ and inserting ‘removal’”).
9
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK, Glossary of Terms at 7 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/eoir/legacy/
2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3WF-W7S3] [hereinafter EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK].
10 Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 242(B)(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988); see
also Memorandum from William R. Robie, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, Operating Policy and Procedure Memorandum
84-2: Cases in Which Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear for Hearing 1 (Mar. 7, 1984),
http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258649 [https://perma.cc/W2WH-WDP9]
(describing operating policy and procedures for how immigration judges may proceed if a
respondent fails to appear). See generally Iris Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting
New Section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 75, 78-80 (1993)
(discussing the impact of the 1990 reform in the in absentia law on judicial discretion).
11 Immigration Act § 545(a), 104 Stat. at 5063. As Jason Cade has shown, government trial
attorneys have very little discretion and must “present the government’s position” by requesting “in
absentia removal orders against respondents who fail to show up.” Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of
Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014).
12 Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)
(2018); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26 (2019) (defining in absentia hearings and identifying factors
sufficient to order a respondent deported in absentia). EOIR defines an in absentia order as “[a]n
order issued when an immigration judge determines that a removable alien received the required
notice about their removal hearing and failed to appear.” EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9,
Glossary of Terms at 7.
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removal are generally barred from seeking admission to the United States or
relief from removal for a period of years.13
Since the 1990 law was put in place, U.S. government oﬃcials have
routinely relied on a purported rise in the prevalence of in absentia removal
orders to support major policy shifts to the immigration system and to
buttress legal arguments defending those changes. For example, in 1995
Congress relied on government-produced statistics showing a “high rate of
no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond” to change the
immigration law to require that noncitizens with certain convictions be
mandatorily detained pending deportation without access to a bond hearing.14
In 2002, the Solicitor General cited those same government in absentia
statistics as persuasive authority in defending against a challenge to the
constitutionality of mandatory detention.15 The U.S. Supreme Court later
relied on the government’s statistical claims to uphold as reasonable the
constitutionality of mandatory detention for immigrants with criminal
convictions to prevent “an unacceptable rate of ﬂight.”16 More recently,
oﬃcials from the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice (DOJ) have
repeatedly told the public that many asylum seekers “simply disappear and
never show up at their immigration hearings,”17 thus justifying tighter
restrictions on the asylum law and even criminal prosecution of asylum
seekers to prevent the court system from being “gamed.”18 Claims about
13 See generally I.N.A. § 212(a)(6)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B) (2018) (providing that failure
to appear without reasonable cause renders a noncitizen inadmissible for five years); I.N.A.
§ 240(b)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7) (stating that failure to appear for a removal hearing bars a noncitizen
from relief for ten years).
14 S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 32 (1995); see also id. (“Congress should consider requiring that all
aggravated felons be detained pending deportation. Such a step may be necessary because of the
high rate of no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond.”). The resulting mandatory
detention rules for those with convictions are codiﬁed at I.N.A. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
15 Brief for Petitioners at 19, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491), 2002 WL
31016560 (arguing that “more than 20% of criminal aliens who were released on bond or otherwise
not kept in custody throughout their deportation proceedings failed to appear for those proceedings”).
16 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519-20 (2003); see also id. at 519 (“Once released, more than
20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings.”).
17 Attorney General Jeﬀ Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Oﬃce for Immigration Review,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeﬀsessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/L6TA-BFFK]; see also
Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on Immigration Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarksimmigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ZBN7-55FZ] (claiming that “loopholes in our laws
[are] being exploited by illegal aliens” who, after release from detention, “simply disappear[]—never
show[] up for their hearings in immigration court”).
18 Attorney General Jeﬀ Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Oﬃce for Immigration Review,
supra note 17. For a thorough analysis of the rise in criminal prosecutions under the Trump
Administration, see Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (on ﬁle with authors).
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failures to appear have also been relied upon by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in rolling out the new Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP)
program that requires migrants to remain in Mexico to await their
immigration court hearings.19 The Department of Health and Human
Services and DHS have also prominently relied on purportedly high in
absentia rates to argue in favor of radically restructuring the established
system that protects children against long-term detention.20
Summary adjudication of cases—without the opportunity to respond and
without regard to the merits of the individual’s eligibility for relief—has been
controversial and raises serious due process concerns.21 The practice also
diﬀers markedly from the criminal system, where failure to appear at trial is
generally treated with issuance of an arrest warrant,22 not adjudication of the
merits of the underlying case without the defendant present in court. For
19 In announcing the MPP on December 20, 2018, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen claimed
that without the new program asylum seekers would simply “disappear into the United States, where
many skip their court dates.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Kirstjen M.
Nielsen Announces Historic Action to Confront Illegal Immigration (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretary-nielsen-announces-historic-action-confront-illegalimmigration [https://perma.cc/ZSS3-3SWB] (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Migrant
Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/KZH4-D3SR] (justifying the
Administration’s new MPP program based in part on the claim that migrants released into the
country “disappear before an immigration judge can determine the merits of any claim”).
20 See, e.g., Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and Unaccompanied
Alien Children, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,486, 45,494 (proposed Sept. 7, 2018) (codiﬁed at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212,
236; 45 C.F.R. pt. 410) (“While statistics speciﬁc to family units have not been compiled, the reality
is that a significant number of aliens who are not in detention either fail to appear at the required
proceedings or never actually seek asylum relief, thus remaining illegally in the United States.”); see
also Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin K. McAleenan on the DHS-HHS Federal Rule on Flores
Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/
08/21/acting-secretary-mcaleenan-dhs-hhs-federal-rule-flores-agreement [https://perma.cc/82YSV9E4] (quoting the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin K. McAleenan claiming that the
majority of removal orders issued to families have been issued in absentia, thus beneﬁtting those
with “meritless claims” for asylum).
21 See, e.g., Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. 113, 121 (B.I.A. 1998) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“It is diﬃcult to imagine what could be more prejudicial to a
respondent charged with being deportable from the United States than denial of an opportunity to
be present at his deportation hearing where he might provide any defenses to the charges against
him, or advance any claims he may have for relief from deportation.”); Villalba-Sinaloa, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 842, 847-48 n.2 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting) (urging the majority to
consider constitutional concerns when interpreting the statutory provision for in absentia removal).
See generally Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial
Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 224 (2016) (arguing that in absentia removal proceedings “may
permit eﬃcient processing of cases, but they do little to ensure that notice is actually received by
migrants who may wish to appear for their hearings but lack adequate information”).
22 Failure to appear is often treated in state court systems as a misdemeanor crime to be
adjudicated separately from the merits of the underlying case. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132506(A)(1), (B) (2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320(a) (2019).
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example, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, a defendant’s
presence in court is required at the beginning of trial and cannot be waived.23
This is very diﬀerent from the immigration court system, where there is no
protection requiring in-person appearance before commencing the trial.24
Although much is at stake, little is actually known about how often
immigrants come to court and the factors associated with these in absentia
orders. President Trump and other oﬃcials oﬀer no veriﬁable empirical
support for their claims that migrants “never” or rarely come to court.
Therefore, scholars, members of the press, and other experts have turned to
the annual report published by the statistical division of DOJ’s Executive
Oﬃce for Immigration Review (EOIR).25 The EOIR’s annual statistical
report has typically included a measurement of the in absentia removal rate,
but has oﬀered only a sparse description of the method used to reach their
measurement.26 No independent analysis of EOIR’s method for calculating
in absentia removal has been performed.
This Article is the ﬁrst academic study of in absentia removal orders in
United States immigration courts.27 In it, we analyze eleven years of
23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a); see also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993) (“The
language, history, and logic of Rule 43 support a straightforward interpretation that prohibits the
trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial.”). If, however, the
defendant fails to appear after already appearing at the beginning of the trial, the trial may continue
under certain circumstances. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c).
24 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
218 (2017) (explaining that unlike in criminal court, a respondent’s failure to appear in immigration
court constitutes an “automatic loss for the noncitizen”).
25 See generally Statistics Yearbook, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
R EVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/statistical-year-book [https://perma.cc/X6GZ-BGQ4]
(last updated Aug. 30, 2019) (containing links to Statistics Yearbooks from ﬁscal year 2000 through
ﬁscal year 2018). Earlier “statistical summaries” were also prepared by the EOIR. See Steve Y. Koh,
Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 430,
431 n.4 (1991) (citing to a 1990 EOIR “Statistical Summary” that was on ﬁle at EOIR). We requested
these statistical summaries from EOIR with a FOIA request, but were informed that EOIR’s oﬃce
that maintains statistics was unable to ﬁnd any legacy ﬁles because “the oﬃce that maintains
statistics was not formed prior to this time and does not retain custody of reports not produced by
them.” Letter from Joseph R. Schaaf, Senior Counsel for Admin. Law, Exec. Oﬃce for Immigration
Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ingrid Eagly (Mar. 21, 2019) (on ﬁle with authors).
26 We note that the EOIR’s 2018 Yearbook included measurements of total in absentia
removals, but for the ﬁrst time eliminated a calculation of the in absentia removal rate. Compare
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK:
FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 33 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/
YG5G-2CNC] [hereinafter EOIR 2018 YEARBOOK] (providing data on the number of in absentia
orders issued in ﬁscal years 2014–2018), with EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 33 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/1107056/download [https://perma.cc/DC4B-YUDQ] [hereinafter EOIR 2017
YEARBOOK] (reporting in absentia rates in addition to the numbers of in absentia orders).
27 In conducting this study, we acknowledge the foundational work of other researchers. The
pathbreaking research of Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), an independent
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immigration court data (from ﬁscal years 2008–2018)28 recently made
available to the public as part of the EOIR’s new “transparency initiative.”29
Our analysis provides the most sophisticated statistical investigation of in
absentia removal available, including both a critique of the limitations of
EOIR’s statistical approach and a proposal for new methods to measure how
often immigrants attend their court hearings. Our verifiable measurements
debunk the claims of the current administration that immigrants “never”
appear for their court hearings, enhance public understanding of the EOIR’s
statistical reporting, and offer data-driven insights into the factors associated
with court appearance.
data-gathering nonproﬁt at Syracuse University, has made updated EOIR statistics available to the
public and published on its website detailed reports of ﬁrst impression on the prevalence of in
absentia removal orders in specific populations, such as cases involving parents with minor
children. See, e.g., Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta [https://perma.cc/D2KV-UVQ5] (select “Hearing
Attendance,” “Immigration Court State,” and “Month and Year Case Began,” and click link for “Not
Present at Last Hearing (Absentia Decision)”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (organizing in absentia
totals by state and time period). Helpful data analysis tools on TRAC’s web page also permit users
to count the number of in absentia removal orders in certain immigration courts (for example,
immigration courts in California) and in certain types of cases (for example, cases involving
juveniles). See, e.g., Priority Immigration Court Cases: Women with Children, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mwc [https://perma.cc/6THA-MWUX] (last visited Feb.
1, 2020); Juveniles—Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://
trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile [https://perma.cc/A25A-TBZD] (last visited Feb. 1,
2020) (laying out annual immigration court cases of juveniles from 2004 through 2019). Our project
also beneﬁts from research by the Catholic Legal Immigration Network and the Asylum Seeker
Advocacy Project that provided independent analysis of the reasons why families seeking asylum
have missed court hearings. See ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT & CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., DENIED A DAY IN COURT: THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF IN
ABSENTIA REMOVAL ORDERS AGAINST FAMILIES SEEKING ASYLUM 16-20 (2019),
https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Denied-a-Day-in-Court-2019-Update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96EB-CTR8] [hereinafter DENIED A DAY IN COURT] (discussing how families
may miss court hearings in part due to lack of notice). Finally, we acknowledge the inﬂuential early
work of the Vera Institute of Justice to study pre-trial release programs associated with increased
appearance rates in immigration court. See EILEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 1
TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ii, 33, 36 (2000), https://www.vera.org/publications/testing-communitysupervision-for-the-ins-an-evaluation-of-the-appearance-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/
2QGW-T6C2] (ﬁnding that roughly 90% of noncitizens who were supervised appeared in court,
compared with 71% of nonparticipants).
28 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/eoir [https://perma.cc/L2AV-VLYR] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (providing a link
to download EOIR case data under the heading “EOIR Case Data”).
29 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review Releases
Court Statistics, Announces Transparency Initiative (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
executive-office-immigration-review-releases-court-statistics-announces-transparency [https://
perma.cc/75LJ-79QK] (explaining that the reoccurring public release of immigration court data is
intended to increase transparency and therefore introduce accountability to the immigration
court system).
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by summarizing the
EOIR’s statistical presentation of data on in absentia removals. Relying
exclusively on the numbers published in EOIR’s Statistics Yearbooks, Part I
analyzes the choices that EOIR has made in its statistical reporting of in
absentia removals, which it reports both in absolute numbers and as a
percentage of initial immigration judge decisions.30
Part II moves beyond the narrow presentation in the EOIR Yearbooks
and engages in an original analysis of the national court data released by
EOIR. Speciﬁcally, Part II supplements EOIR’s approach by developing two
additional methods for measuring the in absentia rate: (1) as a percentage of
all initial case completions (including initial immigration decisions and
administrative closures); and (2) as a percentage of all matters (including
initial immigration decisions, administrative closures, and pending cases).
Administrative closure, a procedure by which a case is indeﬁnitely removed
from the immigration court’s active docket, reached a rate as high as onefourth of initial case completions during our study period.31 Pending cases
also ballooned, reaching over 700,000 cases by the end of our study, with many
left pending for years.32 Critically, for both cases that ended in administrative
closure and cases that remained pending, we show that immigrants appeared
in court when required to do so for scheduled hearings.33 If the signiﬁcance
of the in absentia rate is to measure the likelihood that immigrants comply
with their scheduled court dates, failure to acknowledge administrative
closures and pending cases in presenting data on in absentia decisions leaves
gaps in our understanding of what is happening in immigration courts.
We ﬁnd that over the eleven years of our study, in absentia removals were
18% of initial immigration judge decisions (EOIR’s standard measurement),
but only 16% of all initial case completions, and 12% of all matters.34 We argue

30 As we discuss in Part I, “initial immigration judge decision” is a term of art that the EOIR
uses to refer to the ﬁrst merits decision by the immigration judge.
31 This statistic is based on the authors’ calculations using EOIR data. See infra Figure 1 and
accompanying text; Table 6 and accompanying text. Under the Obama Administration,
administrative closure increased as prosecutors exercised discretion to request closure of cases with
strong equities that were not a priority for removal. See Geoﬀrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1157-59 (2015) (describing the practice of administrative closure as outlined in
a 2011 memo that emphasized the administration’s focus on high priority cases).
32 See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text; Table 6 and accompanying text.
33 For purposes of our analysis, we measure whether the respondent appears at the relevant
hearing based on whether the judge orders in absentia removal at that hearing. Under the law in
eﬀect during the time period of our study, judges must order a removable respondent who fails to
appear removed in absentia unless a valid notice of the hearing was not provided. See supra text
accompanying note 12.
34 These measurements include all custody statuses. See infra Table 6 (“Total” calculations for
ﬁscal years 2008–2018). In Part II of our Article, we focus on nondetained cases only and ﬁnd that
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that these two additional calculation methods (all completions and all
matters) are important and capture large number of cases that are overlooked
in the government’s statistical reporting of immigration court data.
Our independent analysis presented in Part II also uncovers other
evidence that enhances knowledge about the in absentia process. Notably, we
ﬁnd that 15% of the in absentia orders issued during the eleven-year period of
our study were successfully rescinded.35 Our analysis of EOIR data suggests
that this percentage will increase in the future as the in absentia orders issued
in the ﬁnal years of our study begin to be challenged in court. Yet
measurements of the reopening of in absentia orders are not included in any
government reporting on in absentia removal.
Part III proceeds further by exploring the relationship between in absentia
removal decisions and three important factors: attorney representation, ﬁling
of claims for relief, and court location. We ﬁnd a strong relationship between
each of these three factors and the in absentia removal rate. Individuals who
ﬁled claims for relief (such as asylum or cancellation of removal) are very
unlikely to miss court: 95% attended all of their court hearings over the eleven
years of our study in pending and completed nondetained cases.36 Those who
obtained lawyers also almost always came to court: 96% attended all court
hearings in pending and completed nondetained cases since 2008.37 In
addition, the prevalence of in absentia removal varied widely based on court
location, ranging from a low of 15% of initial case completions in New York
City, to a high of 54% in Harlingen, Texas.38 These and other ﬁndings have
meaningful policy implications, which we explore in the Conclusion.
I. EOIR’S MEASUREMENTS
Each year, EOIR publishes a Statistics Yearbook that contains a limited
amount of information about in absentia removal.39 To date, this information

in absentia removals were 34% of initial immigration judges’ decisions, 27% of all completions, and
17% of all matters. See infra Table 7 (“Total” calculations for ﬁscal years 2008–2018).
35 See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018) (providing that following a
motion to reopen a case, an in absentia removal order may be rescinded if the respondent’s failure to
appear was due to exceptional circumstances or the respondent did not receive adequate notice).
36 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
37 See infra Figure 3.
38 This variation in jurisdictional in absentia rate is measured among the twenty-ﬁve most
active base city jurisdictions. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
39 Statistics Yearbooks dating back to ﬁscal year 2000 are publicly available on the EOIR web
page. See Statistics Yearbook, supra note 25 (linking to Statistics Yearbooks from ﬁscal years 2000–
2018). Prior to ﬁscal year 2013, the Yearbook was called the “Statistical Year Book,” but the name has
now been changed to the “Statistics Yearbook.” Compare E XEC. O FFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2013), https://www.justice.gov/

2020]

Measuring In Absentia Removal

827

has been the only available government publication on in absentia orders in
immigration courts. These published statistics are widely cited by the press,40
academics,41 nonproﬁts and think tanks,42 and lawmakers.43
EOIR has consistently presented three diﬀerent data points on in absentia
removals. First, it publishes the total number of in absentia removal orders
issued each year.44 Second, it measures the overall “rate” of in absentia removal
among both detained and nondetained respondents. Third, because in absentia
orders are rare in detention,45 it provides measurements for the in absentia
rate in nondetained cases, a population that includes both individuals who
were never detained and those who were detained at some point but released
from detention.46 In this Part, we reproduce these numbers from EOIR’s
Statistics Yearbook in order to familiarize readers with what these numbers
measure. Later, in Part II, we build on EOIR’s analysis and introduce
alternative methods for measuring in absentia removal.
A. Counting In Absentia Removal Orders
The EOIR Statistics Yearbook reports the total number of in absentia
removal orders issued by immigration judges each ﬁscal year. EOIR
categorizes immigration court cases based on the type of immigration
question under review by the judge, including removal, credible fear review,

sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/04/fy12syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL8D-XMWQ] [hereinafter
EOIR 2012 YEARBOOK], with EOIR 2018 YEARBOOK, supra note 26.
40 See, e.g., Nolan Rappaport, Trump’s Fast-Tracked Deportations May Be Only Solution to
Backlog, THE HILL (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/356211trumps-fast-tracked-deportations-may-be-only-practical-solution-to [https://perma.cc/24T8-W6AM]
(citing data from the 2016 Statistics Yearbook).
41 See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 21, at 159-60 & nn.5-6 (citing data from the 2015 Statistics Yearbook).
42 See, e.g., JEANNE BATALOVA, ANDRIY SHYMONYAK & MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, MIGRATION
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION DATA MATTERS 16 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
immigration-data-matters [https://perma.cc/6TUL-RYE5] (pointing readers to EOIR Statistics
Yearbooks for further information concerning immigration proceedings).
43 See, e.g., Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied Children
and Related Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 119 (2017) (answer of
Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Oﬃce for Immigration Review, Department of Justice) (citing
the 2013 Statistics Yearbook).
44 Technically, EOIR only includes in the Yearbooks the number of in absentia removal orders
issued at the initial case completion stage. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
45 As we explain, infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, immigration judges have ordered
in absentia removal for respondents held in United States custody, despite the fact that doing so
raises due process issues given that respondents in detention are dependent on the government to
transport them to the scheduled hearing.
46 EOIR also included measurements for in absentia removals in asylum cases and UAC cases
in its 2017 Yearbook. EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 33-34. We analyze asylum cases in
Part III of this Article.
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and reasonable fear review.47 According to EOIR, 223,498 out of 237,000 cases
received by the immigration courts in 2016 were for removal, making removal
by far the dominant type of case.48 Removal cases require the judge to make
a decision whether to deport someone from the United States, or instead to
grant the individual relief to remain in the United States.49 EOIR’s
accounting of in absentia orders is not limited to removal cases, but instead
includes in absentia orders issued in all case types.50
Beginning in ﬁscal year 2013, EOIR adopted an “initial case completion”
method for its statistical reporting, and backdated this approach to ﬁscal year
2009.51 This method continued in EOIR’s statistical reporting through ﬁscal
year 2016.52 EOIR deﬁnes an “initial case” as “[t]he proceeding that begins
when the Department of Homeland Security ﬁles a charging document with
an immigration court and ends when an immigration judge renders a
determination.”53 Although many immigration cases do end with the initial
47 EOIR reports eleven different case types. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK B2 & tbl.4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/fysb16/download [https://perma.cc/VT6Z-P5UM] [hereinafter EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK]
(listing diﬀerent “case types”).
48 Id. at B1 & tbl.3.
49 See infra notes 200–206 and accompanying text (describing the two-stage process of
removal proceedings).
50 See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (deﬁning immigration court matters to
include all case types); id. at P1 (reporting the number of in absentia orders out of all initial case
completions for all case types).
51 EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9 (page preceding Table of Contents) (“[I]n an eﬀort
to clarify the agency’s workload, EOIR has changed the methodology for counting matters received
and matters completed, which will aﬀect the appearance of those numbers in the Statistics
Yearbook.”). Prior to ﬁscal year 2013, EOIR counted both initial and subsequent proceedings and
therefore created less clarity about the status of the court’s workload. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 n.74 (2015)
(discussing EOIR’s shift from a proceeding-level analysis to an initial case completion approach).
52 Beginning with the 2017 Yearbook, EOIR made two changes to reported statistics on initial
case completions and in absentia orders. First, EOIR began to focus solely on “I-862” case types,
meaning just removal, deportation, and exclusion case types. Compare EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK,
supra note 26, at 7 (defining the I-862 case types used for initial case completions and in absentia
orders), with EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (defining immigration court matters to
include all case types). Second, EOIR redefined initial case completions to exclude administrative
closures. Compare EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 7 (“Initial Case Completion (ICC) is
the first dispositive decision rendered by an immigration judge . . . . An order . . . administratively
closing a case is not a dispositive decision and, thus, does not constitute a case completion.”), with
EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (“Immigration court completions include immigration
judge decisions and other completions (such as administrative closings) . . . .”). More recently
published statistics on initial case completions are therefore not comparable. Compare, e.g., EOIR
2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C2 (listing 137,875 initial case completions for ﬁscal year 2016),
with EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 10 (listing just 128,201 initial case completions for
ﬁscal year 2016).
53 EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 7. Under this approach, EOIR
does not count decisions to change venue or transfer a case as an initial case completion.
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case completion, some cases continue onto what EOIR calls a “subsequent
case completion,” such as when a case is remanded after appeal or reopened
by the immigration judge.54
Table 1: EOIR Reporting of In Absentia Removal at the
Initial Case Completion Stage, by Fiscal Year
(2009–2016) (All Custody Status)55

Fiscal Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Number
23,269
25,059
22,567
19,449
21,493
26,131
38,329
34,268

Change (%)
—
+8
-10
-14
+11
+22
+47
-11

Table 1 reproduces the numbers provided in the EOIR Statistics
Yearbooks for in absentia removal orders issued by immigration judges at the
initial case completion stage from 2009 to 2016. As seen in Table 1, the annual
number of in absentia orders ﬂuctuated from year to year, decreasing in some
years while increasing in others. During this period, in absentia removals
reached a low of 19,449 in 2012 and a high of 38,329 in 2015.56
B. Calculating the In Absentia Removal Rate
The discussion thus far has presented the annual number of in absentia removal
orders issued each year, as reported by EOIR. But what was the in absentia removal
rate—that is, the percentage of cases that ended in an in absentia removal order?
Since EOIR adopted its initial case completion approach with the 2013
Statistics Yearbook, it has measured the in absentia rate by dividing the
54 EOIR deﬁnes a “subsequent case” as a proceeding “that begins when: 1) the immigration
judge grants a motion to reopen, reconsider, or recalendar; or 2) the Board of Immigration Appeals
issues a decision to remand and ends when the immigration judge renders a determination.” Id.,
Glossary of Terms at 11.
55 Table 1 relies on the in absentia removals reported by EOIR in its Statistics Yearbooks for
ﬁscal years 2009 through 2016 at the initial case completion stage. We selected ﬁscal years 2009
through 2016 for analysis because EOIR used a consistent method for measuring initial case
completions in these publications. See supra note 52. We obtained these data for ﬁscal years 2012 to
2016 from the 2016 Yearbook and added data for ﬁscal years 2009 to 2011, unavailable in the 2016
Yearbook, from the 2013 Yearbook. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1; EOIR 2016
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1.
56 EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1.
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number of in absentia removals issued at the initial case completion stage by
the total number of initial immigration judge decisions issued during the
ﬁscal year.57 EOIR deﬁnes an initial immigration judge decision as the ﬁrst
dispositive decision issued by the immigration judge in a case.58 Immigration
judges have a number of ways to dispose of a case on the merits: they may
order removal, grant relief from removal, or terminate the case. As already
established, removal decisions may be issued in absentia or with the individual
present in court (not in absentia).

57 See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1 (calculating the “in absentia rate” as the
percentage of initial immigration judge completions that end in in absentia removal); see also EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK
P1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8DF-4JVS]; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK P1 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/ﬁle/
fysb15/download [https://perma.cc/WH27-CH6J]; EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1.
Note that while the EOIR 2017 Yearbook uses a similar approach, EOIR narrowed its deﬁnition of
relevant case types and its calculation of relevant immigration judge completions. See supra note 52.
58 See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C1 (“In rendering a decision, the immigration
judge may order the alien removed from the United States, grant some form of relief, or terminate
the case.”). In some cases, there is a subsequent case decision after this initial decision. See id. at A8
ﬁg.3. Subsequent decisions are not analyzed in EOIR’s in absentia measurements and are not
presented here. See id. at P1-P4.
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Table 2: In Absentia Removals as a Percentage of Initial Immigration Judge
Decisions, by Fiscal Year (2009–2016) (All Custody Status)59

Initial Immigration Judge Decisions
Fiscal Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Summary Statistics
Total
Average
(SD)

In Absentia
23,269
25,059
22,567
19,449
21,493
26,131
38,329
34,268

Not In Absentia
193,039
181,099
180,141
150,495
120,822
109,456
100,081
103,607

EOIR
In Absentia Rate
11%
12%
11%
11%
15%
19%
28%
25%

210,565
26,321
(6,578)

1,138,740
142,343
(38,542)

16%
16%
(6%)

Table 2 presents EOIR’s calculations of the in absentia rate, using data
published in the EOIR Statistics Yearbooks. The second column (labeled “In
Absentia”) reproduces the annual totals of in absentia orders that were
presented in Table 1. The third column (labeled “Not In Absentia”) contains
the number of initial immigration judge decisions that were not issued in
absentia. The ﬁnal column presents EOIR’s in absentia removal rate—the
percentage of all initial immigration judge decisions that were issued in
absentia. Over the period measured, the rate varied from a low of 11% in 2009
to a high of 28% in 2015.60 Over the entire period for which data is available
in the EOIR Yearbooks (2009–2016), the aggregate and average in absentia
rate using EOIR’s initial immigration judge decision method were 16%.

59 Table 3 relies on the 2013 and 2016 Yearbooks’ reporting of in absentia removal orders and
the in absentia rate. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1-P4; EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra
note 47, at P1-P4. Based on these raw numbers, we also display total and average immigration judge
decisions and in absentia rates, statistics that are not presented in EOIR Yearbooks. For the purposes
of calculating the average EOIR in absentia removal rate, means were weighted by the total number
of cases in each year.
60 We note that during this time period the overall number of initial immigration judge
decisions declined, a topic with important structural implications for measuring in absentia removal.
See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
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C. Custody Status
EOIR’s annual publications provide one additional data point for
understanding how in absentia orders are distributed: custody status. In
immigration court, there are three diﬀerent possible custody statuses. First,
some individuals are detained throughout their entire case.61 Second, some
individuals are detained but later released from custody on bond or on their
own recognizance.62 Third, some individuals are never detained at any point
during their case.63
As reported in the EOIR Yearbooks and summarized in Table 3, the lion’s
share of in absentia removal orders (69%) were issued to individuals who were
never subjected to detention. An additional 30% of in absentia removal orders
were issued to those who were released from detention on bond or on their
own recognizance.64

61 Individuals who were detained throughout their removal cases comprised 50% (n = 670,586)
of the 1,349,305 initial immigration judge decisions in the EOIR Yearbooks from ﬁscal year 2009 to
2016. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P4 (providing the total number of immigration
judge decisions for fiscal years 2009–2011 and the total number of immigration judge decisions
for nondetained respondents for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1,
P4 (providing the total number of immigration judge decisions for fiscal years 2012–2016 and the total
number of immigration judge decisions for nondetained respondents for fiscal years 2012–2016). For
essential background on how detention has been used to control U.S. borders, see Lenni B. Benson,
As Old As the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11 (2010).
62 Individuals who were released from custody comprised 14% (n = 192,184) of the 1,349,305
initial case completions in the EOIR Yearbooks from ﬁscal year 2009 to 2016. EOIR 2013
YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P3 (for ﬁscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note
47, at P1, P3 (for ﬁscal years 2012–2016).
63 The term “never detained” means that EOIR has no record of the individual being detained
during the pendency of the removal case. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms
at 8. According to statistics published in the EOIR Yearbooks, 36% (n = 486,535) of the 1,349,305
initial immigration judge decisions from ﬁscal year 2009 to 2016 were of individuals who were never
detained. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P2 (for ﬁscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1, P2 (for ﬁscal years 2012–2016). We acknowledge, however, that
some individuals who were never detained during their removal case may have been detained at
some point by immigration authorities.
64 For a more detailed discussion of the process of release from immigration court on bond,
see Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2016).
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Table 3: In Absentia Removal Orders Among Initial Immigration Judge
Decisions, by Custody Status and Fiscal Year (2009–2016)65

Fiscal Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Never Detained
18,710
20,458
15,710
11,676
12,053
15,357
26,912
24,471
145,347

Released
4,189
4,199
6,557
7,689
9,349
10,656
11,346
9,722
63,707

Detained
370
402
300
84
91
118
71
75
1,511

Total
23,269
25,059
22,567
19,449
21,493
26,131
38,329
34,268
210,565

A small number of in absentia orders involved individuals in detention. As
seen in Table 3, 1,511 in absentia orders were issued in detention between 2009
and 2016. Surprisingly, these in absentia orders occurred despite the fact that
individuals were in detention and reliant on the government to transport
them to their hearings. According to EOIR’s statistics division, these in
absentia orders were generally issued when the detained respondent was
unable to come to immigration court “because of illness or transportation
problems.”66 The annual number of in absentia orders in detention has
declined in recent years and since 2015 has been fewer than one hundred
orders per year.67 The issuance of in absentia orders to detainees who were not
transported to their hearings or deemed too ill to attend raises serious due
process questions and should be the subject of future study.68
In Table 4, we summarize the data published by EOIR in its Statistics
Yearbooks to calculate the overall in absentia removal rate (among initial
immigration judge decisions) for never-detained and released respondents.
65 Table 3 relies on the 2013 and 2016 Yearbooks’ reporting of in absentia removal orders for
both never-detained and released respondents. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1-P3
(for ﬁscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1-P3 (for ﬁscal years 2012–
2016). The EOIR Yearbooks do not publish in absentia numbers for detained respondents, but we
were able to calculate those amounts by subtracting the totals for “never detained” and “released” in
absentia removals from the overall published totals. See supra note 61.
66 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2003
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H2 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/eoir/legacy/2008/
04/18/fy03syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Y8-V5QU] (“Failures to appear for detained cases occur very
infrequently, generally only because of illness or transportation problems.”).
67 See supra Table 3.
68 Cf. Evra, 25 I. & N. Dec. 79, 79-80 (B.I.A. 2009) (allowing a noncitizen ordered removed
in absentia while in state custody to seek rescission of that removal order because the failure to appear
had been “through no fault of the alien”). For an argument that detention should be abolished, see
CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION
WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 139-63 (2019).
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As seen in Table 4, EOIR’s in absentia rate ﬂuctuated from year to year and
was generally somewhat lower for individuals who were never detained (30%
from 2009 to 2016), compared to those who were released from custody on
bond or on their own recognizance (33%).
Table 4: In Absentia Removal Rate as Calculated by EOIR,
by Custody Status and Fiscal Year (2009–2016)69
Never Detained

Released

Fiscal
Year

Initial IJ Decisions
Initial IJ Decisions
In
Not In
EOIR In
In
Not In
EOIR In
Absentia Absentia Absentia Rate Absentia Absentia Absentia Rate

2009

18,710

46,773

29%

4,189

13,605

24%

2010
2011

20,458
15,710

52,502
52,154

28%
23%

4,199
6,557

15,087
16,666

22%
28%

2012

11,676

44,972

21%

7,689

17,256

31%

2013
2014

12,053
15,357

40,502
32,613

23%
32%

9,349
10,656

18,457
16,381

34%
39%

2015

26,912

34,026

44%

11,346

15,983

42%

37,646

39%

9,722

15,042

39%

341,188
42,649
(7,696)

30%
30%
(8%)

63,707
7,963
(2,782)

128,477
16,060
(1,496)

33%
33%
(7%)

2016
24,471
Summary Statistics
Total 145,347
Average 18,168
(SD) (5,545)

Given that in absentia removal in detention is so rare, EOIR is correct to
also provide calculations of in absentia removal by custody status. Doing so
provides a more complete picture of how often these orders are issued by
judges. Yet EOIR is only using one method—the initial immigration judge
69 All raw data used for the calculations in Table 4 were obtained from the EOIR Yearbooks.
See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P2-P3 (for ﬁscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P2-P3 (for ﬁscal years 2012–2016). The columns labeled “EOIR In
Absentia Rate” in Table 4 calculate the in absentia removal rate using EOIR’s measurement of in
absentia removals as a percentage of initial immigration judge (IJ) decisions. Table 4, like the EOIR
Yearbooks, does not include data on detained cases because the in absentia numbers are too low for
meaningful display. See supra Table 3. Based on the raw numbers of immigration judge decisions
published in the Yearbooks, Table 4 also calculates the total and average immigration judge
decisions and in absentia rates, statistics that are not presented in EOIR’s Yearbooks. For the
purposes of the average EOIR in absentia removal rate, means were weighted by the total number
of cases in each year.
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decision approach. As we develop in Part II, this choice in method presents a
limited view of the patterns in immigration courts.
II. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR MEASURING
IN ABSENTIA REMOVAL
Part I introduced the basic statistics on in absentia removal presented by
EOIR in its statistical reports. In Part II, we analyze in more detail the
decisions that EOIR made in calculating the prevalence of in absentia removal
in the immigration courts and develop alternative methods for measuring in
absentia removal that we believe improve the overall understanding of how
and when these orders occur in immigration courts.
We approach this task by analyzing the EOIR court data used to create
the EOIR Statistics Yearbooks. However, unlike in Part I where we simply
presented the numbers published in the Yearbooks, in Part II we conduct our
own original analysis. We begin by describing our preparation of the EOIR
data for analysis.
A. EOIR Court Data
We obtained the data for analysis directly from EOIR. As of July 2018,
rather than requiring a written request under the Freedom of Information
Act, EOIR began making its full database of immigration court data available
on its web page for the public to download and analyze.70 EOIR periodically
updates these data, and we analyzed data tables made available by EOIR as
of November 2, 2018. These data included 8,253,223 immigration court
proceedings, with completed and pending cases dating back to 1951.71
Each of these immigration court proceedings contains one or more
hearings. Immigration hearings categorized as “individual” hearings (also
70

According to the “EOIR Case Data” section on EOIR’s homepage:
In 2008, EOIR began receiving requests from a university-affiliated data clearinghouse
for large, raw data ﬁles from the agency’s case ﬁle electronic database. As EOIR has
received at least three FOIA requests for this information, the FOIA Improvement
Act of 2016 requires the agency to make the records available for public inspection in
an electronic format.

Executive Oﬃce for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir
[https://perma.cc/86LC-GVMH] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
71 We found no indications of reliability issues in the data we analyzed (through November
2, 2018) beyond common and correctible errors in data formatting (for example, extraneous tabs
moving data over a column). EOIR has been criticized, however, for its handling of more recent
data provided to the public. See Incomplete and Garbled Immigration Court Data Suggest Lack of
Commitment to Accuracy, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Oct. 31, 2019), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/580 [https://perma.cc/RW26-GSL7] (ﬁnding gaps in EOIR’s data veriﬁcation procedures
that led to the release of unreliable data for September 2019).
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commonly known as “merits” hearings) are scheduled for an immigration
judge to adjudicate the substance of the respondent’s claim (for example,
asylum or cancellation of removal).72 All other hearings are generally referred
to as “initial master” hearings (also commonly known as “master calendar”
hearings), which are scheduled to allow for general administration of the cases
(including, for example, the taking of pleadings, requests for time to ﬁnd an
attorney or time to prepare a case, and the ﬁling of applications for relief).73
To conduct our analysis, we ﬁrst limited these data to those cases with an
initial immigration judge completion occurring between ﬁscal years 2008 and
2018.74 We chose 2008 as the start date for our analysis in order to limit our
analysis to EOIR data entered into the agency’s Case Access System for
EOIR (CASE), which was adopted in 2006 and was phased in through 2007.75
In total, our data contained 3,945,781 immigration court proceedings from the
eleven-year period between 2008 and 2018.76
We next limited our sample to the 3,852,745 removal proceedings in our
data.77 As mentioned in Part I, removal is by far the most common proceeding
72 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 86 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/ﬁle/1084851/download
[https://perma.cc/57QL-C32K] [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL]
(deﬁning “individual calendar hearings” as “[e]videntiary hearings on contested matters”). In our
data, very few cases of in absentia removal (7%) occurred at an individual hearing scheduled to
address the merits of a respondent’s claim (n = 22,877 of 315,780 total in absentia removals).
73 See id. at 73-79 (describing the purposes of master calendar hearings).
74 The federal government’s fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30
of the following year. See, e.g., Federal Budgets by Year, U.S. GOV’T PUBLISHING OFFICE,
https://bookstore.gpo.gov/taxonomy/term/779/fiscal-year-2017-budget [https://perma.cc/3L4NUUS2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
75 See NINA SIULC ET. AL, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM:
EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 74-75
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/LOPEvaluation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9YT53CG] (discussing the 2006–2007 transition to CASE from the earlier case management system,
known as ANSIR); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Privacy Impact
Assessment: Case Access System for EOIR 2 (Sept. 14, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/opcl/docs/eoir_pia.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B7L-277S] (explaining that the then-new CASE
system “will integrate the stove-piped legacy databases for the Immigration Courts and the Board
of Immigration Appeals”). Using the Freedom of Information Act, we have gathered and reviewed
training manuals and reference guides prepared for training judges and court administrators on
how to use the CASE system. Ingrid V. Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families:
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention—Online Appendix, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW: HUGH AND
H AZEL D ARLING L AW L IBRARY, https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/detainingfamilies [https://
perma.cc/8ZZS-KEYU] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
76 If no initial immigration judge completion had occurred between 2008 and 2018, we still
included the case if the ﬁrst scheduled hearing occurred during or after ﬁscal year 2008. Initial
immigration judge completions include both merits immigration judge decisions and all other
completions (for example, administrative closures).
77 The term “removal proceeding” has been in use since 1997 and refers to immigration court
cases for excluding a person seeking to enter the U.S. or deporting a person who is already
present in the United States. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011) (describing the
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type, constituting 98% of the 3,945,781 proceedings between 2008 and 2018.78
Because an individual immigration case may have more than one proceeding,
these 3,852,745 removal proceedings comprised 2,732,988 unique immigration
cases.79 These cases include all custody statuses: never detained, released, and
detained.80 We call this analytical sample the All Custody Removal Sample.
Next, we created a Nondetained Removal Sample, which we limited to
individuals who were not detained at the time of their initial case completion.
This sample includes individuals who were never detained, as well as those
who were detained at some point, but later released from custody. Our
Nondetained Removal Sample contains 2,797,437 removal proceedings
comprising 1,829,049 unique immigration cases.
B. The Changing Immigration Court Docket
EOIR chooses to measure the in absentia removal rate based on the narrow
pool of immigration judge decisions.81 This approach, however, overlooks the
increasing stream of other immigration judge completions (for example,

change in language that accompanied 1996 amendments to federal immigration law, which
folded “exclusion proceeding[s]” and “deportation proceeding[s]” into “a unified procedure, known as
a ‘removal proceeding’”).
78 Immigration courts also handled other types of proceedings during this period, including
credible fear review, reasonable fear review, claimed status review, asylum only, and withholding
only. See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at B1. The EOIR data also included bond
redetermination proceedings that occurred before a document called a “notice to appear” was ﬁled,
known as “zero bond” cases. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, UNIFORM SYSTEM DOCKETING MANUAL I-11 (2013), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/
ld.php?content_id=38100361 [https://perma.cc/3ZNN-C9UB] (explaining that bond redetermination
requests “are separate from the removal hearing process that begins with the ﬁling of the Notice to
Appear at the Immigration Court”). We removed these zero bond proceedings from all analyses.
79 For cases with a 2008 initial case completion, we included any earlier non-initial case
completions that occurred before 2008 (for example, transfer). We counted as pending those cases
completed in ﬁscal year 2019 (that is, those that were completed between October 1, 2018, and
November 2, 2018, when the data were made available).
80 Each immigration court proceeding is classiﬁed by EOIR with one of three codes for
custody status. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 5 (deﬁning “Custody
Status” as “[w]hether or not an alien is detained” and deﬁning the three custody statuses identiﬁed
within the Yearbook). In the EOIR data we analyzed, a detained respondent is coded as “D.” A
respondent who is initially detained but later released—on bond or some alternative type of
condition—is coded as “R.” Finally, if EOIR has no record of a respondent ever having been
detained, the code “N” is used. Some respondents in our sample had multiple custody statuses over
the course of several proceedings. In these instances, we classiﬁed the in absentia removal order based
on the custody status at the time that the in absentia removal order was issued.
81 As explained earlier and developed further in this Section, an “immigration judge decision”
is deﬁned by EOIR as the ﬁrst dispositive decision in a removal case and includes removal,
termination, or relief. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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administrative closures) and pending cases on the court’s docket.82 These
additional categories of cases, we argue, must be considered when addressing
whether immigrants are engaged in the court process. Determining how to
measure the in absentia removal rate, then, ﬁrst requires familiarity with the
categories of cases that ﬂow through the immigration court.
As discussed in Part I, immigration judge decisions are decisions on the
merits to order removal, grant relief, or terminate the case. Yet immigration
judge decisions are not the only way that immigration court cases are
adjudicated. Administrative closure is a discretionary docket-management tool
that immigration judges have used for decades.83 Through this practice, a judge
removes a case from the active docket, thereby putting the case on indeﬁnite
hold and allowing the noncitizen to remain in the United States.84 EOIR does
not, however, include administrative closures in its in absentia calculations.
By far the largest category of immigration court cases today are pending
cases.85 Pending cases are not yet resolved and have ongoing hearings to rule
on motions and applications for relief. Were immigration cases quickly
decided on their merits, excluding pending cases when measuring the in
absentia rate as EOIR does might make sense. But given the immense and

82 As we explain in this Section, cases that are administratively closed by the immigration
judge are not considered by EOIR to have reached an “immigration judge decision.” See infra notes
91–92 and accompanying text.
83 Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors
and Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff, Operating Policies and Procedures
Memorandum 13-01: Continuances and Administrative Closure 3 (Mar. 7, 2013), https://
libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258569 [https://perma.cc/643J-CE6J].
84 Id. at 2 (instructing immigration judges to grant requests for administrative closure “in
appropriate circumstances”); see also IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 72,
Glossary at 1 (2017) (“Once a case has been administratively closed, the court will not take any action
on the case until a request to recalendar is ﬁled by one of the parties.”). In 2018, the Attorney General
issued a decision to greatly restrict the practice of administrative closure. Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018). However, on August 29, 2019, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals abrogated
Castro-Tum, ﬁnding that the immigration law unambiguously permits immigration judges to control
their own dockets. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 286, 292-94 (4th Cir. 2019).
85 See infra Figure 1. In 2017, immigration courts in some jurisdictions began to create “status
dockets” to monitor cases in which respondents are pursuing relief outside of immigration court. See
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: SEEKING
CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DECISION
IN MATTER OF L-A-B-R 39 (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/removal-proceedings/practiceadvisory-matter-l-b-r-27-dec-405-ag-2018 [https://perma.cc/U6VH-3YAX]. Only recently has
EOIR published guidance on status dockets. Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec.
Office for Immigration Review, to All Immigration Court Personnel, Policy Memorandum 19-13:
Use of Status Dockets (Aug. 16, 2019), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=51480401
[https://perma.cc/86UF-UKN3]. Given how new this practice is and the jurisdictional variation in its
implementation, we do not analyze status dockets in this Article.
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growing backlog in the immigration courts,86 cases can drag on for many years
before a decision is reached.87 Additionally, as we will discuss, the data suggest
that immigrants are engaged in the court process as their cases wind their way
through the long court process.
Relying on the All Custody Removal Sample, we investigate these
changes to the immigration court docket. Figure 1 depicts trends in immigration
court cases over the past eleven years. Understanding these different case trends
is fundamental to identifying how best to measure in absentia removal.
The ﬁrst category of cases included in Figure 1 is immigration judge
decisions. We separate immigration judge decisions into two categories: those
issued in absentia and those not issued in absentia. The lower dashed line
(labeled “IJ Decisions (In Absentia)”) measures the annual number of in
absentia removal orders issued in the initial immigration judge completion
stage of the case. The solid line (labeled “IJ Decisions (Not In Absentia)”)
tracks the initial immigration judge decisions made by immigration judges
that were not issued in absentia. Cases ending with a decision not in absentia
include both individuals who were ordered removed and those who obtained
relief.88 One crucial observation from Figure 1 is that initial immigration
judge decisions (the total issued in absentia and not in absentia) have declined
from 206,538 in 2008 to 169,174 in 2018, with a low of 120,414 in 2016. That
is, despite growing caseloads, immigration judges are much less likely to reach
an on-the-merits decision today than they were eleven years ago.

86 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT
AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf [https://
perma.cc/54GQ-LE2C] (finding that EOIR’s case backlog more than doubled between ﬁscal years
2006 and 2015).
87 In our data, new immigration court dates for nondetained cases were set out as late as 2025.
88 Eighty-two percent of the initial immigration judge decisions in our data were not in
absentia (n = 1,471,662 of 1,789,834). Of these non-in absentia decisions, 58% of respondents were
ordered removed (n = 848,979), 16% obtained relief (n = 231,646), and 14% were granted voluntary
departure (n = 210,997). The remaining 12% received termination, prosecutorial discretion, or other
merits outcomes (n = 180,040).
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Figure 1: Case Trends in Immigration Court, by Fiscal Year
(2008–2018) (All Custody Status)89

A second case type shown in Figure 1 are those that are not decided on
their merits, a category that EOIR has referred to as “other completions.”90
During our study period, 96% of “other completions” (n = 226,130 of 236,007)
were administrative closures.91 Other completions also include a few cases
resulting in failure to prosecute and temporary protected status.92
89 Figure 1 presents ﬁscal year totals for removal cases, including both detained and
nondetained cases. These completions include initial immigration decisions (that is, on the merits) and
other immigration judge completions (for example, administrative closures). Changes of venue or transfers
are not counted by EOIR as an initial case completion. We excluded from pending calculations cases that
became pending after the initial completion (for example, a case recalendared after an administrative
completion that is still pending), and therefore our estimates of pending cases are conservative.
90 See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C5 (“Cases that are not decided on their
merits are classiﬁed as other completions.”). Almost all other completions (n = 225,198 of 236,007
total completions) during our study period involved individuals who were not detained at the time
of the judge’s decision to close the case.
91 During the time period of our study, administrative closure was understood by the
immigration courts as “a legitimate method of removing a case from the court’s active docket” and
“preserving limited administrative resources.” See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, supra note
83, at 2 (providing “guidance to assist immigration judges with fair and eﬃcient docket management
practices related to . . . requests for administrative closures and continuances”). We note that in the
2017 Statistics Yearbook, EOIR discontinued referring to administrative closures as “initial case
completions.” See EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 7 (“An order . . . administratively closing
a case is not a dispositive decision and, thus, does not constitute a case completion.”).
92 Other completions are deﬁned in the data by the decision type entry “O” in the “DecType”
ﬁeld. For these other completions, the detailed decision is found by matching the proceeding decision
code (“DecCode”) with the detailed description (“DecDescription”) in the “tblLookupCourtDecision”
lookup table provided by EOIR.
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The lower dotted line in Figure 1 (labeled “Other IJ Completions”) contains
these “other completions.”93 As seen in Figure 1, after years of steady increases,
other completions reached a high of 47,877 in 2016, but began to decline after
President Trump was elected.94 In a controversial decision issued at the end of
our study period in 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions ruled that
immigration judges lacked authority to administratively close cases unless
specifically provided for by a regulation or an existing settlement agreement.95
A third case type of growing importance is pending cases. The top shortdashed line of Figure 1 (labeled “Pending Cases”) shows the skyrocketing
number of pending cases in immigration courts. The number of such cases
has increased by more than 350%, from 156,714 pending cases in 2008 to
707,147 in 2018. Of these 707,147 pending cases, 673,576 involved individuals
who were never detained or released from custody.
The similarities and diﬀerences among these categories of cases—
immigration judge decisions issued in absentia, immigration judge decisions
issued not in absentia, other immigration judge completions (for example,
administrative closures), and pending cases—provides necessary context for
deciding how to measure in absentia removal. We ﬁrst note that initial
immigration judge decisions issued in absentia have several distinct
characteristics. As seen in Table 5, while only 15% of those removed in absentia
had attorneys, 86% of those who were not removed in absentia at the time of
the immigration judge decision had attorneys.96 While only 14% of those
removed in absentia had ﬁled an application for relief from removal (such as
93 In order to count each case only once, our measurements of other completions do not
include decisions to transfer a case or change venue. We note that prior to 2013 EOIR included
transfers and changes of venue in its count of “other completions.” See EOIR 2012 YEARBOOK, supra
note 39, at D1 (“Administrative closures and cases transferred to a diﬀerent hearing location or
granted a change of venue are counted as ‘other completions.’”); see also id. at D3 & ﬁg.6 (including
“Transfer” and “Change of Venue” completions in the total count of “Other Completions by
Disposition”). However, beginning in 2013, EOIR changed its method for calculating other
completions to eliminate the large category of cases that ended in transfer or change of venue. See
EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at C4 & ﬁg.6.
94 For a compelling critique of the growing White House inﬂuence over the decisionmaking
of immigration courts, see Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J.
1, 34-48 (2018).
95 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 271 (A.G. 2018). But see Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282,
294-97 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Castro-Tum is unambiguously contrary to the federal
immigration law).
96 We measured representation by whether a Notice of Entry of Appearance Form (known as
a “Form EOIR-28”) was ﬁled in the case. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. For cases
that reached initial case completion, we counted the respondent as represented if the form was
filed on or before the date of the case completion. If the EOIR-28 was filed after the initial case
completion, we still counted the individual as represented if an attorney appeared in one or more
hearings in the relevant proceeding. We followed this same method in an earlier article. See Eagly
& Shafer, supra note 51, at 79-80.
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asylum), 63% of those present in court at the time of the immigration decision
ﬁled an application for relief from removal.97
An additional key diﬀerence between cases that ended in absentia and
those that did not is in the total case time and number of hearings. As seen
in Table 5, cases ending with in absentia removal were completed in a median
of 218 days, much faster than the median of 583 days for immigration judge
decisions that did not end in absentia.98 The speed of in absentia cases, as Table
5 also highlights, means that they are concluded in fewer hearings. While in
absentia cases had a median of only two hearings, cases that did not end in
absentia had a median of four hearings.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Case Types
(2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)99

Represented
Application for Relief

IJ Decisions
In
Not In
Absentia Absentia
15%
86%
14%
63%

Other IJ
Completions
85%
52%

Pending
67%
57%

Case Length
180 days or more
Median days
Mean days
(SD)
Total (N)

56%
218
362
(424)
316,089

87%
583
736
(591)
614,182

86%
667
798
(617)
225,198

81%
600
803
(698)
673,580

Number of Court Hearings
4 or more hearings
17%
Median hearings
2
Mean hearings
2.3
(SD)
(2.0)
Total (N)
315,780

54%
4
4.6
(3.2)
611,385

51%
4
4.4
(3.2)
223,960

41%
4
4.3
(3.1)
672,674

97 Application for relief is operationalized by whether the respondent ﬁled for any form of
relief with the court. For purposes of our analysis, we did not consider voluntary departure to be a
form of relief. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which considers voluntary departure
to be a form of removal, not of relief. See, e.g., EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C2 (“Orders
of voluntary departure are counted as removals.”).
98 We measured days to completion based on the earliest date in the EOIR system (for
example, hearing date or input date) and the case completion date. For pending cases, we used the
end of ﬁscal year 2018 (September 30, 2018) as the operative end date.
99 Because in absentia removal is something that generally occurs outside of detention, Table
5 relies on our Nondetained Removal Sample.

2020]

Measuring In Absentia Removal

843

Figure 2 presents another way to visualize the diﬀerence between the
number of hearings in the in absentia cases and other case types. As seen in
Figure 2, 47% of in absentia removal orders occurred at the very ﬁrst hearing
in the case. The pattern was very diﬀerent among initial case completions
that did not result in an in absentia order. Less than 9% of non-in absentia
decisions were completed at the ﬁrst hearing.
Figure 2: Number of Hearings Before Initial Completion,
by Decision Type (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)100

At stake in deciding whether and how to include additional case categories
in the analysis of in absentia removal is an honest assessment of immigrants’
interactions with the court. Our analysis of court records at the hearing level
in both administrative closures and pending cases, for example, reveals that
respondents or their attorneys were attending these hearings. Speciﬁcally, we
analyzed the hearing-level adjournment codes associated with the last two
hearings in cases that ended in administrative closures during the study
period of 2008 to 2018. We found that less than 2% of these hearings were
adjourned due to either the respondent or the respondent’s attorney not
appearing at the hearing (n = 2,697 of 136,251).101 EOIR has similarly veriﬁed
100 Figure 2 relies on hearing-level data to assess how many hearings had occurred at the time
that the immigration judge initially completed the case. Of the 1,155,469 initial completions in our
All Custody Removal Sample, only 4,344 cases (0.37%) were excluded from the analysis due to lack
of hearing-level data.
101 See Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Oﬃce for
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors
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that administrative closures are not associated with failures to appear.102 We
also analyzed hearing-level adjournment codes associated with the
penultimate or last hearing in pending cases during our study period. Less
than 1% (n = 5,497 of 667,436) exhibited a non-appearance at the penultimate
or most recent hearing. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that individuals in cases that
are administratively closed or remain pending are indeed coming to court.
One possible objection to including other completions (for example,
administrative closures) and pending cases in the calculation of the in absentia
rate is that these are cases that could end with in absentia removal at some
point in the future. While there is no doubt true that some will ultimately
conclude in absentia, the data suggest that excluding these cases from the
calculation is problematic. Other completions and pending cases are actually
much more similar to cases that do not end in absentia and include significant
involvement by the respondents in their court proceedings. As summarized in
Table 5, other completions and pending cases have a high level of attorney
involvement: 79% of other completions had counsel and 67% of pending cases
had counsel. They also generally include applications for relief: 52% of other
completions had at least one application for relief, as did 57% of pending cases.
Notably, other completions and pending cases involve far more court days than
in absentia cases: other completions had a median of 667 court days, while
pending cases had a median of 600 days pending.103 Other completions and
pending cases also had an average of four hearings already, double that of cases
that ended in absentia and on par with cases that did not end in absentia.104
These descriptive statistics reveal that individuals with administratively
closed or pending cases are in fact interacting with the court system and
attending their scheduled hearings. Indeed, if they had missed their
scheduled hearings, they would have been removed in absentia. The fact that

and Judicial Law Clerks, All Support Staﬀ, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-02:
Deﬁnitions and Use of Adjournment, Call-Up, and Case Identiﬁcation Codes 3 (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258359 [https://perma.cc/LTH2-DE7A]
[hereinafter Adjournment Code Memorandum] (describing Adjournment Code 11, which signifies
“Other No-Show by Alien/Alien’s Attorney or Rep.,” along with forty-seven other adjournment codes
describing other reasons for granting adjournments).
102 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H1 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/eoir/legacy/2010/
03/04/fy09syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP63-E4W6] (explaining that most administrative closures do
not relate “directly to failure to appear”).
103 See supra Table 5.
104 Id. It is important to acknowledge that the most recently ﬁled pending cases in our study
only had one hearing, or were still awaiting a hearing, and therefore were more vulnerable to future
in absentia removal. Speciﬁcally, 11% of nondetained pending cases in our study both began in ﬁscal
year 2018 and had only one hearing scheduled (n = 74,360 of 672,674).
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the majority have counsel and applications for relief on ﬁle also shows they
are invested in and engaging with the court process.105
As we established in Part I, EOIR measures the in absentia rate by
dividing the number of in absentia removals by the total number of
immigration judge decisions (issued in absentia and not in absentia).106 Yet, by
including only immigration judge decisions in their calculation, EOIR’s
measurement of the in absentia rate ignores the two categories of cases that
we just discussed: other immigration judge completions and pending cases.
Over the eleven-year study period (fiscal years 2008–2018), more than 10%—
and in some years upward of 25%—of initial case completions issued were
administrative closures.107 Moreover, as the number of immigration judge
decisions has declined, the number of pending cases has skyrocketed,
exceeding 700,000 by the end of our study period. Appreciating these trends
opens up new methods of measuring in absentia removal.
C. Calculating the In Absentia Removal Rate
With a fuller understanding of case status in immigration court, we now
turn to calculating the in absentia rate using other completions and pending
cases in the denominator.
The ﬁrst alternative method considers in absentia orders as a percentage
of all completed cases, which includes both immigration judge decisions and
other immigration judge completions. We call this the “all case completions”
method. Other completions, composed primarily of administrative closures, are
ones in which we find that respondents are coming to court and not ordered
removed in absentia, yet EOIR’s current approach ignores them entirely.108
The second alternative method considers in absentia orders as a percentage
of all pending and completed cases. We call this the “all matters” method.
Given the very large number of pending cases in which individuals attend
court hearings for years before a decision is reached, failing to include
pending cases in the denominator misses the considerable population of
individuals who are attending ongoing court hearings, and often represented
by counsel and seeking relief.
Table 6 presents in absentia removal rates using EOIR’s immigration judge
method as well as the two alternative approaches just discussed. We find that the
rates vary based on the method selected. First, applying EOIR’s immigration
judge decision method, the in absentia rate for the eleven-year period is 18%. In
See supra Table 5.
See supra note 57 & accompanying text.
See infra Table 6 and accompanying text.
Our analysis of adjournment codes for cases that were administratively closed underscores
that these cases are not associated with failures to appear. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
105
106
107
108
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other words, over the eleven-year period of the study, 82% of initial immigration
judge decisions were issued with the respondent present in court.
Table 6 next shows the in absentia rate based on the all completion
method. The annual rate using this method ﬂuctuated between a low of 10%
and a high of 25%, with percentages slightly lower when only immigration
judge decisions are considered. Other completions are especially consequential,
however, when calculating the proportion of in absentia removal for fiscal years
2015 and 2016. In those years, immigration judges used higher numbers of
administrative closures to help manage their docket.109 Eliminating these
administrative closures from the in absentia rate, as EOIR has chosen to do,
results in a higher in absentia rate while failing to account for large numbers
of respondents who have actively engaged in the court process.
Finally, we calculate the in absentia rate for all matters—that is, both
completed and pending cases. As the last column in Table 6 reveals, the in
absentia rate using the all-matters measurement ranged from a low of 4% to a
high of 7%. The yearly average over the period of our study (2008–2018) was
4% (SD = .01%). In other words, on average, every year 96% of respondents
in removal proceedings in United States immigration courts were not
removed in absentia.

109 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, AILA DOC. NO. 17061538, PRACTICE ADVISORY:
ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE AND MOTIONS TO RECALENDAR 7 (2017), http://www.aila.org/File/
DownloadEmbeddedFile/72088 [https://perma.cc/PR9Z-TKNB] (highlighting the “dramatic[]”
increase in immigration judges’ use of administrative closure in immigration court during the second
term of the Obama Administration, especially after the 2014 “Johnson memo” directed government
attorneys to “seek administrative closure for non-priority cases”).
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Table 6: In Absentia Removal Rate (Initial Case Completions), by
Method and Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (All Custody Status)110
IJ Decisions
Fiscal
Year
2008

In Ab- Not In
sentia111 Absentia
25,355
181,183

Other IJ
Completions Pending
9,102 156,714

In Absentia Removal
Rate (Among . . .)
IJ
All
Deci- ComplAll
sions
etions Matters
12%
12%
7%

2009

22,429

188,718

7,977

191,756

11%

10%

5%

2010
2011

24,239

175,814

8,828

228,890

12%

12%

6%

22,034

174,522

6,355

262,541

11%

11%

5%

2012

19,072

146,313

16,161

291,945

12%

11%

4%

2013

21,023

114,463

28,517

320,989

16%

13%

4%

2014

25,698

96,677

30,767

393,271

21%

17%

5%

2015

38,062

84,899

41,785

416,806

31%

23%

7%

2016

33,968

86,446

47,877

471,232

28%

20%

5%

2017

41,453

98,292

28,941

590,671

30%

25%

5%

2018

44,839

124,335

9,697

707,147

27%

25%

5%

Summary Statistics
318,172 1,471,662
Total

236,007

707,147

18%

16%

12%

133,787
21,455 366,542
(40,715) (14,806) (171,005)

18%
(.08%)

Average
(SD)

28,925
(9,019)

15%
4%
(.06%) (.01%)

The total in absentia rate from 2008 to 2018 using the all-matters method
was 12%. This total rate of 12% is somewhat higher than the annual all-matters
110 Table 6 includes only those immigration judge decisions and other immigration judge
completions that are part of the “initial case completion.” An initial case completion is the ﬁrst
dispositive decision issued by the immigration judge in a case. See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra
note 47, at C1. The measurements in Table 6 for “other IJ completions” include administrative
closures and other decisions that administratively end the case (for example, dismissals for failure
to prosecute and grants of temporary protected status). It does not include changes of venue or
transfers. For purposes of calculating the “Total” in absentia removal rate with all pending cases for
the entire eleven-year period, only the cases that remained pending in 2018 (n = 707,147) were
included in the denominator. Finally, for the purposes of average in absentia removal rates, means
were weighted by the total number of cases in each year.
111 To identify cases that resulted in in absentia removal, we selected those proceedings that
had both (1) removal as the case outcome and (2) a “Y” (yes) indicator in the “absentia” data ﬁeld.
We note that all completed proceedings in the EOIR data contained a “Y” or “N” in the “absentia” data
field. By deﬁnition, we did not consider a proceeding to have resulted in in absentia removal where
the outcome was not removal (n = 3,777 of 319,866).
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rate (which ranged from 4% to 7%) because we included in the overall
denominator only those cases that were still pending as of the end of ﬁscal
year 2018. Using the overall total, 88% of all removal respondents were not
subject to in absentia removal during the eleven-year period from 2008 to 2018.
The all-matters method for measuring the in absentia rate is valuable
because it captures the growing number of cases that are pending but not yet
resolved. Due to large and growing court backlogs, cases can take years to
resolve.112 Not including these pending cases in the measurement of the in
absentia rate results in over-counting of those cases that end with in absentia
orders because in absentia decisions occur more quickly and involve fewer
hearings,113 and those that do not end in absentia can drag on for years. Only
11% of pending cases in our nondetained sample had just begun their cases in
ﬁscal year 2018, suggesting that the vast majority of pending cases were active
in the court system.
In conclusion, by eliminating administrative closures and pending cases
from its published calculations, EOIR ignores a substantial population of
respondents who came to court and attended all their court proceedings. In
doing so, EOIR eﬀectively inﬂates the overall in absentia rate. Our
measurements show a diﬀerent picture.
D. In Absentia Removal by Custody Status
Thus far, this Article has presented EOIR’s data on the total number of
in absentia removals along with three possible measurements for the in
absentia removal rate. In this Section, we extend these three diﬀerent
measurement techniques to the Nondetained Removal Sample. We ﬁnd
similar patterns to those presented in the previous Section. That is, our allmatters and all-completions methods yield lower overall in absentia rates than
the more limited immigration-judge-decision approach adopted by EOIR.

112 See David Wagner, Asylum-Seekers in California Wait for Their Day in Immigration Court,
N.P.R. (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:25 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/09/683328305/asylum-seekers-incalifornia-wait-for-their-day-in-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/JN7V-YRJN] (featuring
asylum seekers who have been waiting years for a court decision).
113 See supra Table 5.
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Table 7: In Absentia Removal Rate (Initial Case Completions),
by Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)114
IJ Decisions

In Absentia Removal
Rate (Among . . .)
IJ
All
Deci- Compl- All
Pending sions etions Matters
144,996
29%
27%
8%

2008

In Absentia
24,882

Not In
Absentia
60,337

Other IJ
Completions
8,020

2009

22,071

57,640

6,803

178,156

28%

26%

6%

2010
2011

23,852

64,357

7,883

212,053

27%

25%

6%

21,739

65,417

5,235

246,153

25%

24%

5%

2012

18,990

60,344

14,994

275,132

24%

20%

4%

2013

20,940

56,727

27,243

303,015

27%

20%

4%

2014

25,587

46,655

29,845

372,884

35%

25%

5%

2015

37,994

45,467

41,003

393,651

46%

31%

6%

2016

33,896

47,579

47,071

443,658

42%

26%

5%

2017

41,374

45,684

28,055

559,855

48%

36%

5%

2018

44,764

63,975

9,046

673,580

41%

38%

5%

Summary Statistics
316,089
Total

614,182

225,198

673,580

34%

27%

17%

Average
(SD)

55,835
(7,990)

20,473
345,739
(14,877) (163,990)

34%
(8%)

27%
(6%)

5%
(1%)

Fiscal
Year

28,735
(9,092)

Table 7 presents our in absentia ﬁndings for individuals who were released
or never detained. The rates are highest when only immigration judge
decisions are used as the denominator, somewhat lower when all completions
are used, and signiﬁcantly lower when pending cases are added into the
calculation (“All Matters”). Consider, for example, the in absentia rates for
2018. The in absentia rate for nondetained respondents was 41% when only
immigration judge decisions are considered, 38% as a proportion of all
completed cases, and only 5% as a percentage of all matters.

114 Table 7 calculates the in absentia removal rate using three diﬀerent methods: immigration
judge decisions, all completions, and all matters. In calculating the average in absentia removal rates,
means were weighted by the total number of cases in each year. The total in absentia rate for all
matters includes only the cases that remained pending in 2018 in the denominator.
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E. Notice Issues and Reopening of In Absentia Removal Orders
Another missing component of EOIR’s approach to measuring in absentia
is appreciation of whether respondents receive eﬀective notice of the removal
proceedings. Whether immigrants are made aware of their court hearings in
accordance with due process cuts to the heart of who is considered at fault for
a failure to appear. This Section analyzes the problem of lack of notice and
investigates immigrants’ eﬀorts to reopen their removal orders issued without
proper notice.
A 2018 United States Supreme Court decision, Pereira v. Sessions,115 has
drawn national attention to the chronic and widespread deﬁcits in providing
individuals notice of their immigration hearings.116 In 2006, Wescley Fonseca
Pereira was served with a charging document (known as a “notice to appear”
or NTA) that did not contain the date and time of his immigration court
hearing.117 Instead, the document ordered Mr. Pereira, who came to the
United States in 2000 and overstayed his visa, to appear in court at a date and
time that would be set in the future.118
Over a year later, the immigration court mailed a notice containing the
actual date and time of Mr. Pereira’s hearing, but Mr. Pereira never received
it because the court did not send it to his correct address.119 When Mr. Pereira
failed to appear at his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia. After
being arrested for a motor vehicle violation in 2013, Mr. Pereira found out
that he had been ordered removed.120
With the help of counsel, Mr. Pereira successfully reopened his prior
court proceeding on the ground that he never received notice of the original
hearing.121 After the immigration judge rescinded the in absentia order, Mr.
Pereira applied for a form of relief known as cancellation of removal.122 One
of the requirements to qualify for cancellation of removal is at least ten years
of continuous presence in the United States.123 Mr. Pereira argued that he
satisﬁed this requirement because he had been in the United State since 2000,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
See, e.g., Joel Rose, Supreme Court Ruling Means Thousands of Deportation Cases May Be Tossed
Out, NPR (Sept. 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/17/648832694/supreme-courtruling-means-thousands-of-deportation-cases-may-be-tossed-out [https://perma.cc/N38U-CBAU]
(explaining that, although the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira did not initially receive much
attention, it has since called attention to notice defects in thousands of deportation cases).
117 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2112.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2018) (providing criteria for the remedy of
cancellation of removal for “certain nonpermanent residents”).
115
116
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while the government claimed that he could not satisfy this requirement
because his “cancellation clock”—that is, the measurement of how long he had
been in the United States—had stopped when he was served with the notice
to appear back in 2006.124
The issue on appeal before the United States Supreme Court was whether
service of a charging document that does not contain the time and date of the
immigration court hearing can “stop time” for purposes of eligibility for
cancellation of removal.125 Section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act contains an explicit requirement that immigration cases begin with the
service of an NTA, which must specify the “time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.”126 However, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the administrative body that decides direct appeals from immigration
court, previously concluded that the time and date of the initial hearing need
not be included on the NTA to trigger the stop-time rule.127
The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the answer to the question was
“obvious.”128 Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor explained that the
“plain text, the statutory context, and common sense all lead inescapably and
unambiguously to [the] conclusion” that “[a] notice that does not inform a
noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceedings” is not a “notice
to appear” under the immigration law.129 Therefore, without the time and date,
such a notice cannot freeze the clock for accruing continuous presence.130
Although Pereira dealt squarely with the stop-time rule, the facts of the
case call attention to the routine and troubling practice of issuing notices to
appear without the time or date information. In fact, at oral argument, counsel
for the government admitted that “almost 100 percent” of notices to appear issued
over the past three years had omitted the date and time of the proceeding.131
124 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2112; see also I.N.A. § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (“[A]ny
period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed
to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear.”).
125 See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110.
126 I.N.A. § 239(a)(1)(G)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2019)
(authorizing Department of Homeland Security oﬃcials to serve a respondent with a “notice to
appear” in immigration court, in accordance with § 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
127 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (citing Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647, 651 (2011)).
128 Id. at 2109-10. Justice Alito, the sole dissenting Justice, concluded that a “straightforward
application of Chevron” required acceptance of the government’s own construction of the statute, rather
than one that the Court regarded as the “best reading of the statute.” Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2110.
130 Id.
131 Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (No. 17-459)
(Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, responding to Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy). In practice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) often served
charging documents with no date or time for the hearing because DHS did not learn when the
hearing would be scheduled until it ﬁled the charging document with the immigration court.
Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All of
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This pervasive defect in notice is part of the reason why noncitizens do not
appear in court.132 The facts of Mr. Pereira’s case also underscore how clerical
court errors—such as serving a notice to the wrong address—can further deprive
respondents of ever learning about their hearings.133
To address these notice deﬁcits, we evaluated how often immigration
judges identiﬁed failures to appear occurring due to notice issues. Each time
a hearing ends, the immigration court enters an “adjournment code” that
describes the reason why the hearing was adjourned. One of these codes
indicates that notice was sent or served incorrectly.134 Looking at the cases of
individuals who were never detained, we found that immigration judges
adjourned fewer than 1% of initial hearings due to notice issues.135 However,
when judges did adjourn these missed hearings due to notice issues, we found

EOIR, Policy Memorandum 19-08: Acceptance of Notices to Appear and Use of the Interactive
Scheduling System 1 (Dec. 21, 2018), http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=46363627
[https://perma.cc/JP6L-GHRY]. This practice is beginning to change after Pereira. See id. at 1-2
(“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions . . . EOIR began providing dates and
times directly to DHS to use on NTAs . . . .”).
132 For further discussion of practice issues in the wake of Pereira, see CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: PEREIRA V. SESSIONS—UPDATED STRATEGIES
AND CONSIDERATIONS (2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/council-practice-advisory-pereira-vsessions [https://perma.cc/RP98-LWKD]; DAN KESSELBRENNER ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION
PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD & IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, PRACTICE ADVISORY:
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF NOTICES TO APPEAR LACKING TIME-AND-PLACE
I NFORMATION 9-19 (2018), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/
practice_advisories/gen/2018_5July_PereiraAdvisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK84-VH2Q].
133 Litigation is ongoing over the jurisdictional validity of removal orders issued based on
charging documents without time and date information. In August 2018, the BIA issued a
precedential decision which limits the application of Pereira to the stop-time rule in requests for
cancellation of removal. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 442-43 (B.I.A. 2018). Speciﬁcally,
the BIA found that an NTA “that does not specify the time and place of an alien’s initial removal
hearing vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and meets the
requirements of [§ 1229(a)], so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent
to the alien.” Id. at 447. Some federal courts of appeals have found, consistent with Bermudez-Cota,
that an NTA that fails to include date and time can still vest jurisdiction with the immigration court
so long as a notice of a hearing specifying this information is later sent to the respondent. See, e.g.,
Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192, 196-97 (6th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158,
1158-59, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1106 (2020). Other courts have rejected this
view, concluding that DHS may not rely on a subsequent notice of hearing to cure a defective NTA.
See, e.g., Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr, No. 19-9517, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020); Guadalupe v.
Attorney Gen. United States, No. 19-2239, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2020).
134 Adjournment Code Memorandum, supra note 101, at 3 (including Adjournment Code 10,
to be used when an “[a]ttorney and/or alien does not appear at the scheduled hearing due to the
notice of hearing containing inaccurate information, or, alien/attorney appears but has not received
adequate notice of hearing of the proceedings”).
135 Analyzing never-detained cases, we found that 11,121 out of a total of 1,285,947 initial
hearings, or .86%, were adjourned due to lack of notice. This calculation measures the number of
hearings that were adjourned with code 10, “Notice Sent/Served Incorrectly.” See supra note 134. Use
of adjournment code 10 in our data dates back to the 1980s.
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that 54% of these respondents appeared in court at the next hearing.136 This
is an essential data point, from which we draw two important conclusions.
First, although Pereira revealed that notice issues were prevalent during our
study period, notice issues were rarely identiﬁed by immigration judges.
Second, when immigration judges did pay attention to notice issues, the
majority of respondents made it to court after the notice issue was addressed.
Part of the story behind the lack of attention to proper notice is the fact
that immigration judges do not have decisional independence. Currently,
immigration judges are part of the Department of Justice and appointed,
reviewed, and disciplined by the Attorney General.137 As immigration scholar
Jill Family explains, the structure of immigration courts “provides no formal
protections for these administrative decision makers.”138 Concerns have been
raised that immigration adjudicators are hired based on their political
loyalties,139 and that, as a result, ruling against the government could be
hazardous to their job.140 Growing case backlogs, strict case quotas, and
mandatory timelines for case completions have further amplified the pressures
on immigration judges.141 This lack of judicial independence no doubt increases
pressure to enter in absentia orders quickly without first rigorously evaluating
the merits of whether proper notice was in fact supplied to the respondent.142

136 Analyzing both completed and pending cases, we found that 5,981 out of the 11,121 hearings
adjourned for lack of notice at the initial-hearing stage did not end in absentia, compared to 5,140
that did result in an in absentia order.
137 See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 543 (2011) (“One major problem with the system is a
lack of decisional independence at the administrative level. The lack of decisional independence
stems from the placement of immigration judges and the Board as mere employees of the Attorney
General.”); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 10-12 (2008), https://www.naij-usa.org/
images/uploads/publications/Urgent-Priority_1-1-08_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV2F-8WWQ]
(raising concerns regarding the lack of judicial independence).
138 Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing Immigration Removal and
Benefits Adjudication, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 45, 51 (2011).
139 Id.
140 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
369, 385-403 (2006) (arguing that judicial independence is necessary to uphold the rule of law).
141 See, e.g., Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Director, Exec. Oﬃce for
Immigration Review, to Oﬃce of the Chief Immigration Judge, All Immigration Judges, All Court
Administrators, and All Immigration Court Staﬀ (Jan. 17, 2018), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/
ld.php?content_id=39231331 [https://perma.cc/C6NP-7HAV] (outlining case completion goals and
performance metrics for immigration judges).
142 In an important new study, Catherine Kim and Amy Semet ﬁnd that the presidential
administration that is in control is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of removal rates. Catherine Y.
Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO.
L.J. 579, 625-27 (2020). This troubling ﬁnding increases concern that decisions of political actors
within the administration may in fact inﬂuence the decisionmaking of immigration judges.
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Given that so few judges adjourn hearings due to notice issues, we next
evaluated what happened after the initial in absentia order was entered. Most
immigration cases end after an initial case completion,143 but some cases do
continue on to a subsequent case completion.144 Like an initial case
completion, a subsequent case completion can end in a decision on the merits,
like a removal, relief, or termination decision, or an administrative completion,
such as administrative closure or transfer. In other words, an initial proceeding
that ends with in absentia removal might be subsequently reopened and a new
proceeding conducted. Importantly, the government’s reporting of in absentia
removal omits any analysis of subsequent case completions.
Under the immigration law, an in absentia removal order may be
challenged in court and reversed if the respondent did not receive notice of
the hearing or if there were other “exceptional circumstances” that caused
their failure to appear.145 Common reasons identiﬁed by immigration
attorneys for failures to appear in immigration court include not receiving
notice of the hearing, serious health or transportation problems, and
ineﬀective assistance of counsel.146 In practice, the respondent or respondent’s
143 EOIR deﬁnes an “initial case” as “[t]he proceeding that begins when the Department of
Homeland Security files a charging document with an immigration court and ends when an immigration
judge renders a determination.” EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 7.
144 EOIR deﬁnes a “subsequent case” as a proceeding “that begins when: 1) the immigration
judge grants a motion to reopen, reconsider, or recalendar; or 2) the Board of Immigration Appeals
issues a decision to remand and ends when the immigration judge renders a determination.” Id.,
Glossary of Terms at 11. For example, according to the EOIR data published in its Statistics
Yearbooks, in 2016 there were 186,434 initial case completions and 20,609 subsequent case
completions. EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A8.
145 I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018). See generally BETH WERLIN, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: RESCINDING AN IN ABSENTIA ORDER OF
REMOVAL 7-10 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/practice_advisory/
rescinding-absentia-order-removal [https://perma.cc/8TAX-UMNT] (providing legal guidance on
how to establish exceptional circumstances); Rebecca Feldmann, What Constitutes Exceptional? The
Intersection of Circumstances Warranting Reopening of Removal Proceedings After Entry of an In Absentia
Order of Removal and Due Process Rights of Noncitizens, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 219, 224, 234-45
(2008) (arguing that “circumstances beyond a person’s control, as clearly established by the totality
of the circumstances” should meet the statutory “exceptional circumstances” requirement). Each
immigration judge also has the authority to reopen any proceeding in which she issued a decision,
upon the judge’s own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2019). For an excellent overview of motions
to reopen, see MICHELLE MENDEZ & REBECCA SCHOLTZ, CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION NETWORK,
INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: MOTIONS TO REOPEN FOR DACA RECIPIENTS WITH REMOVAL
ORDERS 14-32 (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/removal-proceedings/practice-advisorymotions-reopen-daca-recipients-removal-orders [https://perma.cc/33A9-5LJ5]. We also thank the
Honorable Mimi Tsankov, Regional Vice President, National Association of Immigration Judges,
for helping us to understand motions to reopen.
146 CONCHITA CRUZ ET AL., ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT & CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., A GUIDE TO ASSISTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS WITH IN ABSENTIA
R EMOVAL O RDERS 4 (2019), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/asylum-and-refugee-law/guideassisting-asylum-seekers-absentia-removal-orders [https://perma.cc/JX9H-V73X].
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attorney would bring a motion to reopen the proceeding, explain the reasons
why the hearing was missed, and ask the judge to rescind the in absentia order
and continue with the merits of the case.147
Using our Nondetained Removal Sample of EOIR data,148 we analyzed
the impact of subsequent case review on in absentia removal orders. Overall,
as seen in Table 8, in absentia removal occurred in 316,089 nondetained initial
case completions over the eleven years of our study. Of these, 15% (n = 47,952)
were successfully reopened.149
Table 8: Reopening of In Absentia Removal Orders,
by Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)150

Fiscal Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

In Absentia
at Initial
Completion
24,882
22,071
23,852
21,739
18,990
20,940
25,587
37,994
33,896
41,374
44,764
316,089

Successful
Motion to Reopen
4,716
4,560
4,651
4,331
3,464
3,799
4,188
5,558
4,589
4,812
3,284
47,952

Reopened
(Percent)
19%
21%
19%
20%
18%
18%
16%
15%
14%
12%
7%
15%

These results show that some cases in which a judge issued an in absentia
order of removal were later successfully reopened. This ﬁnding is important
147 TRINA REALMUTO & KRISTIN MACLEOD-BALL, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,
PRACTICE ADVISORY: THE BASICS OF MOTIONS TO REOPEN EOIR-ISSUED REMOVAL ORDERS
PRACTICE ADVISORY 4-5 (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/the_basics_of_motions_to_reopen_eoir-issued_removal_orders_practice_
advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2X5-L2MQ].
148 See supra Section II.D.
149 In contrast, of the 839,380 initial case completions that did not end in an in absentia removal
order, we found that only 0.58% (n = 4,865) had been ordered removed at the most recent proceeding.
150 Table 8 counts as reopened those cases in which respondents were ordered removed in
absentia at the initial case completion, but then had a subsequently opened proceeding. “Fiscal Year”
corresponds to the year of the initial case completion (not the year that the case was reopened).
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because the analysis of in absentia relied on by the government assumes that
all in absentia orders are entered for individuals who never come to court. On
the contrary, as many as one-ﬁfth of those removed in absentia in any given
year did later come to court to protest the entry of the in absentia order.151
In addition, older cases have a higher rate of reopening than newer cases.
For cases that received an in absentia order in 2008, 19% have been reopened.152
In contrast, only 7% of in absentia orders entered in 2018 have been
reopened.153 This outcome makes sense, as many individuals with in absentia
orders may not yet be aware that they were ordered removed and need time
to make a motion to reopen in immigration court. Given the legal complexity
of such a motion, individuals will also need time to ﬁnd and retain counsel.
Over time, therefore, we can expect the percentage of in absentia cases that
are reopened to rise.154
Whether a case is reopened, however, rests in the hands of immigration
judges. In order to grant a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order, a
judge must ﬁnd that the hearing notice was defective, the respondent was in
custody at the time of the hearing,155 or that exceptional circumstances
excused the failure to appear.156 Of the 316,089 cases where initial completion
occurred through an in absentia removal order, 18% (n = 56,877) of those

See supra Table 8.
Id.
Id.
A motion to reopen based on lack of notice of the hearing can be brought at any time. See
I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (2019) (noting
that an alien can ﬁle a motion to reopen at “any time”). Of course, individuals who do not obtain
counsel or otherwise learn about the motion to reopen process may never bring such a motion in
court. Additionally, although cases with in absentia orders may be reopened, in absentia orders cannot
be appealed. See Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in
Immigration Removal Adjudication 21 (June 7, 2012) (draft report), https://www.acus.gov/report/
immigration-removal-adjudication-report [https://perma.cc/46PZ-KY5X] (“The BIA has held that
a respondent may not appeal from an in absentia order although in some cases the individual may
seek a motion to reopen.”).
155 See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (providing for rescission of a
removal order “upon a motion to reopen ﬁled at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien
did not receive notice . . . or the alien demonstrates that the alien was in Federal or State custody
and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien”).
156 A respondent may later reopen the immigration case based on a showing that the failure
to appear was due to exceptional circumstances. See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i)
(stating that an in absentia removal order may be rescinded “upon a motion to reopen ﬁled within
180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear
was because of exceptional circumstances”); see also I.N.A. § 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1)
(indicating that exceptional circumstances include “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child
or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or
parent of the alien”).
151
152
153
154
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respondents sought to reopen their cases by ﬁling motions to reopen.157
Judges granted 84% of these motions (n = 47,952). Overall, 15% of those
ordered removed in absentia had a successful motion to reopen (n = 47,952 of
316,089).158 This ﬁnding suggests that those who have moved to reopen by
and large have meritorious grounds for reopening their cases.
Our ﬁndings about the reopening of in absentia orders are consistent with
an inﬂuential report by Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC).
Analyzing in absentia cases handled by their oﬃce since 2015, CLINIC found
that their lawyers were able to successfully reopen 96% of these in absentia
orders.159 Judges were willing to reopen because CLINIC’s clients had
“legitimate reasons for being unable to attend their hearings, including lack
of notice, incorrect government information, serious medical problems,
language barriers, and severe trauma or disabilities.”160
In conclusion, Part I relied on statistics presented in the EOIR Statistics
Yearbooks to summarize how the government has presented in absentia
removal over the past decade. We showed that the measurement of in absentia
removal has been limited to the percentage of in absentia orders among
immigration judge decisions and has not included other completions or
pending matters in these calculations. In Part II we engaged in our own
original analysis of the EOIR data to develop new methods for measuring
in absentia removal. Overall, we found that the number of in absentia removal
orders has increased somewhat since 2008, but this increase has been far
outpaced by the addition of new cases into the immigration courts. Only 12%
of all matters in the immigration courts since 2008 ended in an in absentia
removal order.161 Moreover, 15% of initial case completions that ended with
in absentia removal were later successfully reopened.162 These and other
findings introduced in Part II contribute a clearer picture of how to measure
in absentia removal.

157 EOIR provides data on all motions ﬁled before the immigration courts, including
“Motions to Reopen” and “Motions to Reopen for In Absentia.” Of the 56,877 respondents who
sought to reopen their cases, we include 191 respondents who did not have motions to reopen in the
data but whose in absentia removal orders were clearly rescinded, as indicated by the opening of
subsequent proceedings.
158 We note that of these 47,952 individuals with a successful motion to reopen, 7% (n = 3,523)
were ultimately ordered removed in absentia.
159 DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 6, 17.
160 Id. at 6.
161 See supra Table 6.
162 See supra Table 8.
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III. UNDERSTANDING IN ABSENTIA REMOVAL
In Part III, we seek to discover additional factors associated with in
absentia removal. As the discussion that follows reveals, we ﬁnd that whether
someone receives an in absentia order is associated with three important
variables: attorney representation, applications for relief from removal, and
judge assignment.
A. Attorney Involvement
Noncitizens have a right to be represented by counsel in immigration
proceedings, but generally not at the expense of the government.163 Following
a 2010 court decision, one exception to this rule is for individuals in detention
who have serious mental impairments. In such cases, counsel is appointed by
the court.164 Immigration court rules allow respondents to be represented by
attorneys or, less frequently, by “accredited representatives” who are not
attorneys but work for nonproﬁt organizations that specialize in immigration
court practice.165
Prior to representing someone in court, attorneys must file a Notice of
Entry of Appearance (EOIR-28).166 The EOIR data allow us to determine
163 See I.N.A. § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2018) (“[T]he alien shall have the
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d
549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due process right to obtain counsel of their choice at their
own expense.”).
164 See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1051-58 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (ﬁnding that
plaintiﬀs’ mental conditions and the importance of the issues in their cases mandated
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act in the form of providing “Qualiﬁed Representatives”
for “the entirety of their immigration proceedings”). After the district court decision in FrancoGonzalez, the United States agreed to a nationwide policy to appoint counsel for immigrants with
serious mental disabilities. See Press Release, Exec. Oﬃce for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for
Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguards-unrepresentedimmigration-detainees.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR36-3HET] (“EOIR will make available a qualified
representative to unrepresented detainees who are deemed mentally incompetent to represent
themselves in immigration proceedings.”).
165 See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (2019) (providing criteria under which qualifying organizations
may designate non-attorney representatives to practice before an immigration judge or immigration
law enforcement agency); see also 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a)(4) (designating these non-attorney
representatives “accredited representatives” and authorizing their practice). For a thoughtful
discussion of the options available to expand access to legal representation in immigration court, see
Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, MPI INSIGHT (Migration Policy Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, at 1, 12-16, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revisiting-needappointed-counsel [https://perma.cc/F2CY-RH5V].
166 See Exec. Oﬃce for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Form EOIR-28, Notice of
Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before the Immigration Court (rev. Dec. 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir28.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7UN-7BHS] [hereinafter
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whether a respondent had counsel because they report whether an EOIR-28
form was filed with the immigration court.167 If the required form was filed
with the court prior to or by the conclusion of the relevant proceeding, we
counted the respondent as represented.168 We also counted respondents with
late-filed EOIR-28 forms as represented if court records showed that an
attorney appeared in an immigration court hearing during the relevant
proceeding.
To evaluate the relationship between representation and in absentia
orders, we examined the rate of in absentia removals among those who had
counsel over the eleven-year study period. As seen in Figure 3, individuals
with counsel rarely received in absentia removal orders. Among nondetained
represented respondents who reached an initial immigration judge’s merits
decision, only 8% were ordered removed in absentia.169 Among all nondetained
cases that reached an immigration judge completion, only 6% with counsel
ended with in absentia removal.170 Finally, if all nondetained matters are
considered, the in absentia rate for represented respondents was only 4%.171

EOIR-28 Form]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (“In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge in
which the alien is represented, the attorney or representative shall ﬁle a Notice of Entry of
Appearance on Form EOIR-28 with the Immigration Court.”).
167 Our replication of calculations published in the EOIR’s annual reports reveals that the
ﬁling of the EOIR-28 form is also relied upon by EOIR in its statistical analysis of representation
by counsel in immigration court.
168 In December 2015, the EOIR-28 form was revised to allow for an attorney to represent the
respondent in the bond proceedings without taking on the merits of the case. See EOIR-28 Form,
supra note 166; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (“The entry of appearance of an attorney or
representative in a custody or bond proceeding . . . shall be separate and apart from . . . appearance
in any other proceeding before the Immigration Court. . . . [A] representative may ﬁle an EOIR-28
indicating whether the entry of appearance is for custody or bond proceedings only, any other
proceedings only, or for all proceedings.”). For purposes of our analysis, we only measure whether
an EOIR-28 form was ﬁled as part of the merits portion of the case.
169 Out of all the immigration judge initial merits decisions issued in cases involving
nondetained respondents during our study period (n = 930,271), 62% (n = 574,199) had counsel.
170 Out of all the nondetained immigration judge initial case completions (both merits and
other completions) issued during our study period (n = 1,155,469), 66% (n = 766,576) had counsel.
171 Out of all the nondetained immigration judge initial case completions and pending cases
occurring during our study period (n = 1,829,049), 63% (n = 1,148,544) had counsel.
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Figure 3: In Absentia Removal Rate Among Respondents with Counsel,
by Calculation Method (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)172

We also ﬁnd that most cases in which judges entered in absentia orders
involved unrepresented litigants. Overall, only 15% of those who were ordered
removed in absentia during our study period had an attorney.173 By contrast,
86% of those who avoided an in absentia order had counsel.174
Similar patterns were associated with the reopening of in absentia orders.
As discussed in Part II, 15% of nondetained in absentia orders entered over the
past eleven years have been reopened.175 We ﬁnd that the ability to reopen is
mainly reserved for those who ﬁnd counsel. That is, among those who were
able to successfully reopen their case after an in absentia removal order, 84%
had a lawyer representing them.176
172 Figure 3 measures the percent of represented respondents that were ordered removed in
absentia from 2008 to 2018.
173 Of the 316,089 in absentia orders issued in removal proceedings at the initial case
completion over the eleven-year period of our study, only 47,350 were represented by counsel.
174 Of the 839,380 immigration judge initial completions not issued in absentia in removal
proceedings over the eleven-year period of our study, 719,226 were represented by counsel. The
Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC) has also found, based on data released by EOIR,
that individuals without attorneys are at higher risk of being removed in absentia. See FOIA
Disclosures on In Absentia Removal Numbers Based on Legal Representation, CLINIC LEGAL (Mar. 27,
2020), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/freedom-information-act/foia-disclosures-absentia-removalnumbers-based-legal [https://perma.cc/47CD-C3J5].
175 See supra Table 8.
176 Of the 47,952 respondents who successfully reopened their cases after an initial in absentia
order, 40,303 were represented by counsel at their most recent proceeding.
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As these striking statistics suggest, attorneys play a vital supporting role
in ensuring that their clients make it to court.177 Without a lawyer, some
respondents attend their check-in appointments with ICE believing erroneously
that it is their court date and then miss their actual court date.178 Other
respondents have reported missing their hearings after being given NTAs with
no court date or with a fake court date at an erroneous location.179
Unrepresented respondents may also encounter challenges in completing the
necessary court documents to reschedule an immigration court hearing or to
notify the court about a change of address.180 For example, despite policy to
the contrary,181 immigration courts do not always accept notifications of changes
of address before proceedings have formally begun, leaving respondents unable
to receive notice of their hearings at their current address.182
Attorneys receive written notice of hearing dates and times and therefore
can notify their clients about when their hearing is scheduled and where the
court is located.183 Attorneys can also help their clients who do not speak
English by interpreting forms and notices into their clients’ primary

177 Recognizing the crucial role that attorneys play, Stephen Manning and Juliet Stumpf argue
in favor of a large scale and collaborative representation model—“big immigration law”—in which
teams of volunteer attorneys focus on speciﬁc legal issues and geographic areas to increase
representation rates and ensure access to justice. Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration
Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 420-32 (2018).
178 Respondents awaiting immigration court hearings are often told to report periodically to a
deportation officer. We thank New York-based immigration attorney Jeffrey Chase for this example.
179 See, e.g., Tatiana Sanchez, Confusion Erupts as Dozens Show Up for Fake Court Date at SF
Immigration Court, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/
Confusion-erupts-as-dozens-show-up-for-fake-13579045.php [https://perma.cc/BHJ2-CQ3X]
(reporting that some attorneys contend that ICE is sending notices to appear “with court dates it
knows are not real”).
180 See DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 15 (discussing some of the challenges that
pro se respondents encounter in filing motions and changing their address with the immigration court).
181 Memorandum from Mark Pasierb, Chief Clerk of Immigration Court, to All Immigration
Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors and Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration
Court Staff 6 (June 17, 2008), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=52153727
[https://perma.cc/3CUT-QHWZ] (“EOIR-33/ICs are accepted even if no Notice to Appear has
been ﬁled.”).
182 See, e.g., AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions and Answers 3 (Oct. 21, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/29/eoiraila102108.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8SK-8NEL] (reporting rejections of changes of address forms in cases where the notice
to appear had not yet been ﬁled with the court).
183 The EOIR’s mandatory electronic registry for attorneys and accredited representatives
provides notice directly to counsel. See Registry for Attorneys and Representatives, 78 Fed. Reg.
28,124, 28,124 (May 13, 2013) (“The eRegistry will individually and uniquely identify each registered
attorney or accredited representative and associate the information provided during registration with
that attorney or accredited representative. This will increase efficiency by reducing system errors in
scheduling matters and providing improved notice to attorneys and accredited representatives.”).
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language.184 When court dates change or judges are reassigned, attorneys can
explain these essential changes to their clients. If a hearing is scheduled at a
time or location that is not feasible for a respondent to attend, attorneys can
ﬁle a motion with the court to change the venue or time and date of the
hearing. Without this assistance, respondents can get confused about where
and when to report to court.185
In highlighting the association between counsel and court appearance, we
acknowledge that attorneys may select cases of individuals who have stronger
claims and thus are more highly motivated to attend their court hearings.186
Similarly, individuals who seek out and hire attorneys may be less likely to
miss a court appearance because they have invested in the process.
Furthermore, in demonstrating the value of eﬀective counsel, we do not mean
to suggest that attorneys always help their clients to attend court. As Chief
Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
unskilled and unscrupulous immigration attorneys have been known to fail to
notify their clients of the hearing dates they were required to attend.187 In
these unfortunate circumstances, relying on a lawyer to navigate the court
process could actually lead to missing the court hearing.
The immigration court does provide an 800 number to call for
information about future court dates,188 but many respondents may be
unaware of this service. In addition, this toll-free line only provides access to
a recording and requires that the caller have the respondent’s eight or nine
digit case identiﬁcation number to receive information.189 The EOIR hotline
184 As Jennifer Koh has noted, in absentia orders also raise important issues about quality of
counsel. Not all attorneys provide quality representation and in some cases fail to properly notify
their clients about upcoming hearings or miss court themselves. See Koh, supra note 24, at 225
(explaining that in absentia orders “raise unique access to counsel issues that require an acknowledgment
of how the quality of counsel matters”).
185 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Fearful of Court, Asylum Seekers Are Banished in Absentia, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 30, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/30/fearful-of-courtasylum-seekers-are-deported-in-absentia [https://perma.cc/AYM3-L7CH] (featuring a case of an
unrepresented individual who was almost ordered removed in absentia when he mistakenly went to a city
courthouse in Charleston, South Carolina instead of the immigration court in Charlotte, North Carolina).
186 See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 51, at 48 (discussing selection bias issues in representation
in immigration court).
187 Robert A. Katzmann, Study Group on Immigrant Representation: The First Decade, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 488 (2018); see also DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 25-26
(featuring examples of individuals who missed their hearing because their attorney failed to notify
them of the court date).
188 See Customer Service Initiatives, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/customer-service-initiatives [https://perma.cc/FQ72ND4P] (updated Mar. 20, 2018) (explaining that by calling the 800 number, a “customer[]” can
obtain information including the “[n]ext hearing date, time, and location”).
189 See id. (explaining how the “automated immigration court information system” functions
and explaining that “[t]o access case information, callers must use the alien registration number,
which begins with the letter A and is followed by an 8- or 9-digit number”). Using the toll-free line
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is also only available in English and Spanish,190 making it inaccessible to
individuals who do not speak these languages.
Our ﬁndings on the strong association between counsel and court
appearance rates build on an earlier study by the Vera Institute for Justice on
the Legal Orientation Programs (LOP), a program that provides know-yourrights sessions and intensive pro se training sessions for individuals in
detention.191 The Vera Institute’s study found that LOP participants who
received know-your-rights services, as compared to those who did not, had a
7% lower rate of in absentia removal after release.192
Vera’s ﬁndings are consistent with studies of other court systems
indicating that individuals with access to information about the court process
are more likely to come to court.193 For example, a program in Jeﬀerson
County, Colorado called unrepresented misdemeanants and traﬃc oﬀenders
to remind them about their misdemeanor and traﬃc oﬀense hearings.194 The

is so complicated that nonproﬁt organizations have created materials describing how to call the line
to obtain information about your court date. See, e.g., Cómo Chequear el Status de su Caso, ASYLUM
SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT, https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CheckingYour-Status-with-Copyright.png [https://perma.cc/P4SD-75YP] (providing Spanish-language
instructions for accessing commonly sought information through the automated toll-free system).
If there is an in absentia order, pressing “1” will tell the caller that there is no hearing scheduled.
They must know to press “3” in order to learn about an in absentia order. See id.
190 Customer Service Initiatives, supra note 188.
191 See SIULC ET AL., supra note 75, at iii-iv, 7-9 (explaining that the LOP, originally funded
in 2002 through a $1 million congressional appropriation to DOJ, “refer[s] cases to volunteer
attorneys and conduct[s] individual and group orientations on immigration law and procedure . . .
for detained persons in removal proceedings”).
192 Id. at 56-57.
193 See PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, PRETRIAL JUSTICE BRIEF 10, USE OF COURT
DATE REMINDER NOTICES TO IMPROVE COURT APPEARANCE RATES 1-4 (2017),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/PJCC/PJCC%20Brief%2010%20Sept%202017
%20Court%20Date%20Notification%20Systems.ashx [https://perma.cc/38SW-Y8MF] (explaining
that “notiﬁcation systems may help to improve the court appearance rates of defendants, thereby
reducing the community and court costs associated with missed hearings,” and summarizing the
eﬀects of four approaches to court date notiﬁcation systems on failure-to-appear rates); David I.
Rosenbaum et al., Court Date Reminder Postcards: A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Using Reminder Cards to
Reduce Failure to Appear Rates, 95 JUDICATURE 177, 178-80 (2012) (evaluating the results of the
Nebraska Postcard Reminder Project which reduced failure-to-appear rates at misdemeanor hearings
by almost 25%). Related research has suggested that individuals who are given notice of other court
obligations, such as the requirement of paying a ﬁne, are more likely to do so if enhanced notice is
given. See, e.g., BETH A. COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS WITH GRADUATED
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY 19-20, HAMILTON PROJECT (Mar. 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Colgan_PP_201903014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G93J-TVWZ] (stating that supportive collection practices such as the “issuance of notices
prior to payment due dates, similar to those used to remind people of due dates for utilities, credit
cards, and the like, are also helpful” in improving collections).
194 Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing CourtAppearance Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The Jeﬀerson County,
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program reduced the failure-to-appear rate from 21% to only 12%.195 Results
were even better when the caller spoke personally with the defendant (rather
than just leaving a message): the failure-to-appear rate for these individuals
dipped to only 8%.196 A reminder program implemented in the misdemeanor
court in Coconino County, Arizona had similar success.197 The failure-to-appear
rate for those who were called in the reminder program was only 12.9%, compared
to 25.4% in the control group.198 For those who were personally contacted on the
phone, the rate was the lowest: only 5.9% failed to appear.199
These and other studies underscore that many people miss court simply
because they are not notified about their hearing, do not recognize the
importance of attending, do not know where to go, or simply forget about their
court date. Language barriers and unfamiliarity with the court process and notice
procedures compound these difficulties. As we discuss further in the Conclusion,
EOIR could improve appearance rates by addressing these notice issues.
B. Applications for Relief
Immigration removal proceedings are best understood as occurring in two
stages.200 In the ﬁrst stage, the immigration judge decides whether to sustain
the charge of removability alleged by the United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in the NTA.201 If the charge is sustained and the
respondent is found to be subject to removal, the respondent can seek relief
from removal in the second stage.202 There are numerous forms of relief in
immigration court. The most commonly sought are asylum,203 cancellation of
Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES
ASS’N 86, 88-89 (2012).
195 Id. at 89.
196 Id.
197 WENDY F. WHITE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL & FLAGSTAFF JUSTICE
COURT, COURT HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION PROJECT 3 (2006), https://community.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=34fdeae8-c04e-a57d-9ccae5a8d4460252 [https://perma.cc/UHR7-BWNT].
198 Id. at 4.
199 Id.
200 Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 957-58 &
fig.5 (2015).
201 Id. at 957; see also Am. Immigration Council & Penn State Dickinson Sch. of Law, Practice
Advisory: Notices to Appear: Legal Challenges and Strategies 7-16, American Immigration Council
& Penn State (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV9-X7VY]
(summarizing the government’s burden in establishing inadmissibility or deportability and
providing strategies for requesting administrative closure or termination).
202 Eagly, supra note 200, at 957.
203 Asylum is a form of discretionary relief available to individuals who qualify as refugees by
demonstrating past persecution or a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on the noncitizen’s
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and/or membership in a particular social group. I.N.A.
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removal,204 and adjustment of status.205 To qualify for relief, a respondent
must satisfy the applicable statutory eligibility requirements and convince the
judge that the case merits the favorable exercise of discretion.206 A respondent
who wins relief will be able to remain lawfully in the United States.
Across the eleven years of our study period, 48% (n = 549,053 of 1,155,469)
of nondetained (released or never detained) individuals in removal
proceedings sought some form of relief prior to the initial completion in their
cases.207 Among these individuals who sought relief, 72% had an asylum
application (n = 392,788);208 28% applied for cancellation of removal for lawful
permanent residents or non-lawful permanent residents (n = 151,561); and 10%
applied for adjustment of status (n = 45,356).
Using the all-matters method, we ﬁnd that nondetained respondents
applying for relief had very high appearance rates. Overall, 95% of all litigants
with completed or pending applications for relief came to all of their court
hearings between 2008 and 2018.209 This result makes sense: individuals
pursuing claims for relief in court have a strong incentive to come to court so
that they can win permission to remain in the United States.210
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018); I.N.A. § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
Applicants for asylum may also be considered for relief under withholding of removal and protection
under the Convention Against Torture by satisfying a more stringent standard. See I.N.A.
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (providing statutory requirements for demonstrating eligibility
for withholding of removal); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 882-93 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing the availability of relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture).
204 Cancellation of removal is a form of relief available to both lawful permanent residents and
undocumented individuals who have lived for a minimum number of years in the United States and
who satisfy certain requirements. I.N.A. § 240A(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b).
205 Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal available to any noncitizen who is
determined eligible for lawful permanent resident status based on a visa petition approved by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. I.N.A. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
206 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 203, at 725-26.
207 Respondents may apply for multiple forms of relief with the immigration court. We did
not consider applications for voluntary departure to be a form of relief. See supra note 97.
208 EOIR Form I-589 includes an application for asylum and withholding of removal, and also
oﬀers the opportunity for an application of withholding of removal under the Convention Against
Torture. See U.S. Customs & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Security & Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding
of Removal (rev. Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/i-589 [https://perma.cc/6MJU-W5NY]
(listing the information that an applicant is required to provide to apply for asylum and withholding
of removal). By “asylum application,” we refer to an application for all three forms of relief.
209 During the study period, there were 829,083 completed and pending cases with
applications for relief on ﬁle (n = 549,053 initial completions with such applications, and n = 431,752
initial immigration judge decisions with ﬁled applications). Of these individuals, only 43,250 had an
in absentia removal order, leading to in absentia rates of 5% for all matters, 8% for initial case
completions, and 10% for immigration judge decisions.
210 See Oren Root, Nat’l Dir., Appearance Assistance Program, Vera Inst. of Justice, The
Appearance Assistance Program: An Alternative to Detention for Noncitizens in U.S. Immigration
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Figure 4 presents the in absentia rates for nondetained respondents who
sought relief in immigration court, organized by the most common types of
relief (asylum, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status). We present
these ﬁndings using all three possible measurements for in absentia removal:
as percentages of all immigration judge decisions on the merits, all initial case
completions, and all matters.
Figure 4: In Absentia Removal Rate, by Application Type and
Calculation Method (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)211

The in absentia rate for all matters is a particularly valuable metric for
respondents seeking relief. Litigating eligibility for relief in immigration
court can take years and involves multiple court hearings that require
respondents to come to court. In a previous study, we found that cases in
which respondents applied for relief had an average of just over seven
hearings before the case was resolved.212 Over the eleven-year period of our
study, we ﬁnd that only 6% of all matters involving asylum applications ended
with an in absentia order. For those seeking cancellation of removal, the in
Removal Proceedings 2 (Apr. 2000), https://www.vera.org/publications/appearance-assistanceprogram-alternative-to-detention [https://perma.cc/65A6-TQ38] (arguing that individuals with
claims for relief are “good candidates for supervised release, as they have an incentive to appear at
their hearings”).
211 Figure 4 calculates the proportion of individuals ordered removed in absentia with any of the various
forms of application for relief on file. Note that individuals may apply for more than one form of relief.
212 Analyzing removal cases decided between 2007 and 2012, we found that respondents with
counsel had a mean of 7.7 hearings, while those without counsel had a mean of 7.1 hearings. Eagly
& Shafer, supra note 51, at 65 tbl.6.
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absentia rate was even lower: only 3% of all matters seeking cancellation were
associated with a failure to appear. Finally, among all matters in which the
respondent sought adjustment of status the in absentia rate was only 2%.213
These ﬁndings are noteworthy because they reveal that immigrants
seeking relief are highly likely to come to court. Such statistics have not
traditionally been part of the EOIR Yearbooks, which provides only overall
rates, not ones organized by application type.214
C. Judicial and Jurisdictional Variation
We next explore whether the rate of in absentia removal varies by court
location or by judge. Currently, there are sixty diﬀerent cities in the United
States that host immigration courts,215 and approximately 400 immigration
judges appointed by the Attorney General of the United States.216 In previous
work, we have found that courts in different geographic locations are associated
with very different patterns in how they decide cases.217 Other important
research on immigration courts has found large variation in how immigration
judges decide their cases. In a trailblazing study that sounded an alarm on this
issue, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag found
that immigration judges varied so widely in their decisionmaking on asylum
cases that the court system could best be understood as a game of chance:
“refugee roulette.”218 More recent research on asylum decisions has found that
the local political context of the immigration court is also associated with
diﬀerent case outcomes. For example, immigration judges were less likely to

213 Among those seeking relief who also had attorneys, the in absentia rate for all matters was
even lower: 2.9% for those seeking asylum, 1.9% for those seeking cancellation of removal, and 1.7%
for those seeking adjustment of status. These measurements are not displayed in Figure 4.
214 See supra Part I (summarizing data presented in the EOIR Yearbooks). In 2018, EOIR
began to occasionally report in press releases and other documents statistics on in absentia rate among
those seeking asylum. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Oﬃce for Immigration
Review Releases Court Statistics, Announces Transparency Initiative (May 9, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-releases-court-statistics-announcestransparency [https://perma.cc/T3EA-3JAK].
215 EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing [https://perma.cc/TWM6-7Y5E] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
216 Oﬃce of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/GWA9-P86E] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
217 See Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum
Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 848-52 (2018).
218 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 327-49, 378 (2007). Early research by the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse also identified disparities among immigration judges, even when
isolating their analysis to the affirmative asylum petitions of nondetained Chinese nationals in the New
York City area who were represented by counsel. Immigration Judges, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 31,
2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 [https://perma.cc/RW26-GSL7].
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grant asylum if they sat in courts where the local economy was poor or in
counties that voted Republican in the last two presidential elections.219
Here, we are interested in the rate at which different courts, and judges
within those courts, ordered in absentia removal. To analyze this question, we
looked at the twenty-five court locations with the greatest number of
nondetained initial case completions across the study period.220 For each of these
top twenty-five court locations, we then calculated the in absentia rate as a
percentage of that court’s initial case completions.221 The results of our analysis
are displayed in Figure 5.
Figure 5: In Absentia Removal as a Percentage of Initial Case Completions,
by Court Location (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)222

219 Daniel E. Chand, William D. Schreckhise & Marianne L. Bowers, The Dynamics of State
and Local Contexts and Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions, 2017 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
182, 189-92 (2017); see also Kim & Semet, supra note 142, at 614-15, 618 tbl.1, 618 n.210 (explaining
that immigration judges “may be inﬂuenced by the broader political and economic environment of
the base city in which they sit”).
220 We focus here on the twenty-ﬁve jurisdictions with the greatest number of nondetained
initial case completions across our study period, accounting for almost nine out of ten of these
completions (n = 1,027,694 of 1,155,469).
221 Like EOIR, we deﬁne initial case completions as including both initial immigration judge
decisions and other completions, which include administrative closures. See, e.g., EOIR 2016
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at B2.
222 Figure 5 provides descriptive statistics for the twenty-ﬁve jurisdictions from our
Nondetained Removal Sample with the greatest number of initial case completions. Figure 5 includes
the total number of initial case completions, the proportion of never-detained cases, the number of
active immigration judges (that is, those with one hundred or more initial case completions
annually), and the percentage of initial case completions that ended with in absentia removal.
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The variation in in absentia rates by city is striking. As seen in Figure 5,
in absentia rates ranged from a high of 54% in Harlingen, Texas to a low of
15% in New York City. The three courts that handled the highest numbers of
nondetained cases during our study—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New
York—also had among the lowest in absentia rates.
Some of these diﬀerences across jurisdictions no doubt reﬂect diﬀerent
migrant populations at these court locations. In column 3 of Figure 5 we
calculate by jurisdiction the percentage of nondetained initial case
completions that involved respondents who were never detained (as opposed
to being released from detention). In Harlingen, Texas, for example, only 20%
of initial case completions were for never-detained respondents; the
remaining 80% were for individuals who were released from detention.
Interestingly, however, there was still wide variation in in absentia removal
rates across cities with similar proportions of never-detained cases. For
example, approximately two thirds of the dockets in both San Francisco and
Dallas were composed of cases of individuals who were never detained, but
the in absentia rate in San Francisco was 19%, compared to 41% in Dallas.
At least some of this deviation in appearance rates reﬂects diﬀerences in
local court practices. For example, some local courts may have better and
more timely systems in place for scheduling court hearings and notifying
respondents about their upcoming court hearings. A 2017 DOJ on-site review
of the immigration court in Baltimore, Maryland, found that the court was
so understaﬀed as caseloads grew that administrators were unable to enter
change-of-address paperwork sent to the court into their computer system.223
This problem means that respondents would not receive their court notices,
which the report warned “can result in respondents being ordered removed
in absentia through no fault of their own.”224 As our data reveal, 33% of
respondents in the Baltimore court were removed in absentia.225
Another court practice that is associated with whether respondents came
to court is the length of delay between the issuance of the NTA and the initial
court date. Looking only at never-detained initial case completions,226 we
found that the average time between the ﬁling of the NTA and the initial
223 Ani Ucar, Leaked Report Shows the Utter Dysfunction of Baltimore’s Immigration Court, VICE
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/xw94ea/leaked-report-showsthe-utter-dysfunction-of-baltimores-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/K6J6-DGWT].
224 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
225 See supra Figure 5.
226 To address the potential relationship between delays in court scheduling and in absentia
removal, we narrowed our analysis from all initial case completions to only never-detained initial
case completions with no prior change of venue or transfer (n = 745,031 of 1,155,469). Of the
remaining 745,031 initial case completions, we excluded 4,678 cases (less than 1%) with missing or
erroneous NTAs. Finally, to focus on more active cases, we narrowed the analysis further, excluding
the 3% of remaining cases (n = 21,638) with NTAs dated prior to 2006.
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hearing was 239 days (SD = 251) for cases that ended in absentia. By
comparison, on average there were only 167 days (SD = 197) between the ﬁling
of the NTA and the ﬁrst hearing in never-detained cases that did not end in
absentia. The median number of days showed similar patterns: 153 days
median for cases ending in absentia, compared to 101 days median for cases
not ending in absentia. This ﬁnding suggests that, on average, long delays can
make it harder for people to receive proper notice, remember their court
hearings, and remain in contact with the court.
The availability of counsel in diﬀerent jurisdictions is an additional
contributing factor to variation in failures to appear. In previous work, we
found that some cities have very few practicing immigration attorneys. These
problems were most acute in smaller cities where detained courts tend to be
located. For example, we found that Lumpkin, Georgia, did not have a single
practicing immigration lawyer, and Oakdale, Louisiana, had only four.227 As
a result, the rate of attorney representation also varies dramatically between
immigration courts.228
Figure 6 displays the relationship between the in absentia removal rates
and access to counsel in these twenty-ﬁve court locations. Notably, those
cities with the highest in absentia rates also had the lowest representation
rates. For example, as seen in the upper-left corner of Figure 6, in Harlingen,
Texas, where 54% of nondetained respondents were ordered removed in
absentia, only 41% of nondetained respondents had counsel. In sharp contrast,
as seen in the lower-right corner of Figure 6, 85% of nondetained respondents
in New York City’s immigration court had counsel,229 and only 15% were
removed in absentia.

Eagly & Shafer, supra note 51, at 42.
See id. at 40 (“In the busiest twenty nondetained court jurisdictions, representation rates
reached as high as 87% in New York City and 78% in San Francisco. At the low end of these
twenty high-volume nondetained jurisdictions, only 47% of immigrants in Atlanta and Kansas City
secured representation.”).
229 This high representation rate reﬂects the 2014 establishment of a project known as the New
York Immigrant Family Unity Project, which provides free legal representation to any individual in
New York’s immigration court who is unable to aﬀord counsel. New York Immigrant Family Unity
Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrantfamily-unity-project [https://perma.cc/DZ26-62X3] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
227
228
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Figure 6: Relationship Between In Absentia Removal Rate and Representation
by Counsel, by Base City (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)230

Variation across immigration courts could also reﬂect diﬀerences in
judicial decisionmaking on when to issue an in absentia order. To explore this
issue, we examined the in absentia rates of individual judges who had at least
one hundred nondetained initial case completions during the study period,
what we call active judges.231 Figure 7 displays the in absentia rates for active
judges in the top twenty-ﬁve busiest court locations. Each individual judge is
represented by a pipe (“|”).232 These markings visually depict variation
among judges at the city level. For example, the seventeen active judges in
Houston ordered in absentia removal at surprisingly different rates, from a low
of 16% to a high of 92%. Similarly, in Baltimore, one active judge ordered in
absentia removal in almost every single case, whereas three judges had in
absentia rates below 30%.

230 Figure 5 analyzes the twenty-ﬁve jurisdictions from our Nondetained Removal Sample
with the greatest number of initial case completions. In it, we compare the in absentia removal rate
at the initial case completion with the overall representation rate in the jurisdiction.
231 Focusing on these active judges allows us to more reliably analyze commonalities and
variations within jurisdictions. During our study period, these active judges accounted for 99% of
all initial case completions (n = 1,015,606 of 1,027,694 initial case completions) in the busiest twenty-five
jurisdictions.
232 In addition, the total number of active immigration judges in each jurisdiction is listed
alongside the city on the y-axis of Figure 7.
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Figure 7: In Absentia Removal Rate for Active Judges,
by Court Location (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)

Acknowledging judicial variation within cities underscores that judges in
diﬀerent jurisdictions do vary in their approaches to ordering in absentia
removal. Even so, the overall pattern across these diﬀerent court locations
remains striking.233 This ﬁnding suggests that local court practices and norms
are relevant to shaping how judges within diﬀerent jurisdictions rule when
faced with a respondent who does not come to court.234
In summary, Part III builds on the methods introduced in Part II to analyze
the relationship between in absentia removal and attorney representation,
applications for relief, and court jurisdiction. We show that respondents who
have attorneys almost always come to court, as do those who seek relief in court.
Rates of in absentia removal also vary by judicial district, although individual
judges within those districts also order in absentia removal at uneven rates. As
See supra Figure 5.
Research in the context of the federal criminal courts has similarly found that judges are
inﬂuenced by the local court context within which they practice. See, e.g., Brian Johnson et al., The
Social Context of Guidelines Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737,
737-38, 767-73 (2008) (ﬁnding that organizational court context was associated with variations across
federal district courts in the likelihood of judge-initiated downward departures in sentencing
decisions); Jeﬀery T. Ulmer & Brian D. Johnson, Organizational Conformity and Punishment: Federal
Court Communities and Judge-Initiated Guidelines Departures, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253,
266-89 (2017) (ﬁnding variation in sentencing practices of federal judges at the local district court
level was associated with local organizational culture and expectations).
233
234
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we now discuss in the Conclusion, these findings have implications for how
immigration courts adjudicate cases and other policy debates.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article with a simple question: Do immigrants come to
their immigration court hearings? Contrary to the claims of current
government oﬃcials that immigrants “never” come to court, our data-driven
analysis reveals that 88% of all immigrants in immigration court with
completed or pending removal cases over the past eleven years have attended
all their court hearings.235 Limiting our analysis to only nondetained cases,
we still ﬁnd a high compliance rate: 83% of all nondetained respondents in
completed or pending removal cases attended all their hearings since 2008.236
These and other measurements of in absentia removal presented in this Article
contest recent claims by President Trump and other government oﬃcials that
almost all immigrants abscond from court.
A key insight of our analysis is that the method chosen for measuring
failures to appear matters. As we have set forth, the method adopted by the
government to measure rates of in absentia removal—as a percentage of initial
immigration judge decisions—ignores a large number of court cases in which
respondents continue to appear in court. In particular, the government’s
measurement ignores cases that are administratively closed, an essential tool
that has been used by immigration judges over the past decade to remove
cases indeﬁnitely from the immigration court’s docket. The government’s
measurement also ignores the historically high number of backlogged cases
pending in immigration courts today. These backlogs matter because
nondetained deportation cases now take many court hearings and several
years to resolve. This Article has argued that counting administrative
completions and pending cases in the in absentia removal measurement is a
necessary complement to the government’s measurement that enhances
public understanding of the rate at which noncitizens are complying with
their court dates. We recommend that future statistical reporting by the
EOIR include these measurements.
As this Article has shown, immigration court compliance rates must be
considered against the backdrop of a pervasive failure of the Department of
Homeland Security to include the time and date of hearings in the charging
documents given to individuals in removal proceedings. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions has put the spotlight on the challenges
that respondents often face in ﬁnding out about their court dates. This reality
235
236

See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 7 and accompanying text.
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has made it hard for individuals—particularly if they do not speak English,
are unfamiliar with the court system, and do not have lawyers—to ﬁgure out
when and where to go to court. The fact that half of in absentia decisions over
the past decade were issued at the ﬁrst or second court hearing237 reveals that
immigration judges have been quick to penalize respondents for not
appearing in court. In light of these issues, one simple reform that could be
implemented is to train judges to use the ﬁrst hearing to ensure that proper
notice was provided before issuing any in absentia ﬁnding. The immigration
courts could also learn from the proven success of other court systems in
providing reminder calls or postcards with the accurate time and date of the
hearing.
Our Article also contributes to the growing understanding of
jurisdictional variation in immigration court decisionmaking. We ﬁnd that
rates of in absentia removal varied widely based on the geographic location of
the immigration court. While factors such as the availability of immigration
attorneys and local prosecutorial practices no doubt contribute to these
patterns, our ﬁndings suggest that local court practices for handling failures
to appear play a salient and underappreciated role in how cases are resolved.
Greater training of immigration judges to ensure consistency in their
application of the in absentia process—which requires the government to
prove that written notice of the hearing was provided and that the respondent
is subject to removal—is essential.
Unlike government reports that ignore the subsequent history of in absentia
orders, this Article also explored whether in absentia orders withstood later
review. Since 2008, 15% of those who were ordered removed in absentia have
successfully reopened their cases and had their in absentia orders rescinded.238
This crucial finding suggests that many individuals who are removed in absentia
wanted to attend their court hearings but never received notice or faced
hardship in getting to court.
We believe that giving immigration judges greater independence to give
respondents a second chance to come to court would help address this issue
and enhance court appearance rates. The immigration law gave judges this
independence prior to 1990, and this earlier version of the law could provide
a starting point for reform.239 Indeed, before the 1990 change in the law when
judges were given more discretion on how to handle failures to appear in
court, they often exercised caution by not ordering deportation when they
were concerned that respondents might not have received notice of the

237
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239

See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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hearing.240 Our independent analysis of current EOIR data reveals that in
those rare cases where immigration judges did give individuals a second
chance to come to court, half did show up at the next hearing.241
Other essential reforms that our research supports include removing case
quotas and aggressive case completion goals. Immigration judges are already under
immense stress in their jobs.242 Placing heightened pressure on immigration
judges to complete their cases more quickly can improperly influence judges to
issue in absentia orders in haste, even when notice is clearly inadequate.
More ambitiously, this study supports the growing momentum behind
creating an independent structure for the immigration courts.243 The federal
tax and bankruptcy courts provide precedent for creating specialized federal
courts under Article I of the United States Constitution.244 Such an
independent court structure would help to reduce the prevalence of in absentia
orders by giving immigration judges more authority over their dockets and
individual case decisions.245
240 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-18, IMMIGRATION CONTROL:
DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 30 (1989),
http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/140072.pdf [https://perma.cc/U88N-C6SN] (noting that immigration
judges in New York and Los Angeles interviewed prior to 1990 “said they are willing to hold
deportation hearings in absentia only if they are convinced that the aliens received proper
notiﬁcation of the time and place of the hearing”).
241 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
242 Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 60 (2008)
(ﬁnding that the burnout level of federal immigration judges was higher than the levels reported by
hospital physicians and prison wardens).
243 In 2018, Senators Mazie K. Hirono, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Kamala Harris introduced the
Immigration Court Improvement Act, a bill that would insulate immigration judges from top-down
political interference. Press Release, Sen. Mazie K. Hirono, Hirono, Gillibrand, Harris
Introduce Bill to Insulate Immigration Judges from Political Interference 1 (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://hirono.senate.gov/news/press-releases/hirono-gillibrand-harris-introduce-bill-to-insulateimmigration-judges-from-political-interference [https://perma.cc/CPR4-748M]. An early proposal
for an independent immigration court was made prior to the establishment of the EOIR by Maurice
Roberts, the former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Maurice Roberts, Proposed: A
Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1980).
244 The Federal Bar Association (FBA) recently completed a report proposing model
legislation to establish an Article I immigration court. See Congress Should Establish an Article I
Immigration Court, FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policypriorities/article-i-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/CQ5D-C2AU] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
The FBA proposal is supported by the union representing immigration judges, the National
Association of Immigration Judges. See Letter from Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n
of Immigration Judges, to Elizabeth Stevens, President, Fed. Bar Ass’n, Immigration Law Section
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_endorses_FBA_Article
_I_proposal_3-15-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC29-BVH3] (endorsing the Federal Bar Association’s
proposed legislation due to the “proven . . . conﬂicts of interest” that arise when immigration courts
can be used as “political pawn[s] by various administrations on both sides of the aisle”).
245 Although the creation of an Article I immigration court would solve many problems within
the court system, as Amit Jain has warned, such a change must be accompanied by other procedural
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The complex and nuanced picture of in absentia removal presented in this
Article also has immediate relevance to the current debates in which statistics
on failures to appear play a key role. For example, our ﬁnding that the vast
majority of nondetained respondents attend their court hearings does not
support initiatives for stricter detention rules and expanded detention
capacity.246 Rather, this study supports releasing more respondents from
custody given the high likelihood that they will attend their future court
hearings. Our analysis showing that asylum seekers almost always attend their
court hearings similarly undermines arguments that asylum seekers should be
prevented from entering the country out of a fear they will not come to
court.247 And our data showing that noncitizens with lawyers have near
perfect attendance rates suggests that expanding funding for pro bono
lawyers and know-your-rights programs could play an important part in
improving the functioning of the immigration court system.248
Our overarching goal in this Article is to encourage policymakers and
future researchers to think critically about how to measure in absentia
removal. This topic has generated considerable debate and much confusion
in the past. It has also led to the increasing incarceration of noncitizens. Our
data-driven analysis uses the government’s own court database to insert
veriﬁable measurements into the discussion. Moreover, we present
alternative methods of measurement that can be relied upon in future
research to produce reliable and understandable measurements.

and substantive forms. Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,”
33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 324 (2019).
246 See supra Table 7 and accompanying text.
247 See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Figure 3 and accompanying text.

